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TAX EXEMPTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY
ARVO VAN ALSTYNE*
One of the most pervasive and firmly established anomalies in
American law is the permissibility of subsidization of religious insti-
tutions through tax exemption in a legal order constitutionally committed
to separation of church and state.' Despite occasional doubts which have
been voiced, 2 and in the teeth of judicial acknowledgments that such ex-
emptions are indeed a substantial form of economic assistance,3 there
seems to be no ground for believing that an assault upon first amend-
ment grounds would succeed today or in the foreseeable future.
4
Understanding of the modern law of tax exemptions of church
property begins with the constitutional law of the several states.5 Such
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1 See, generally, JOHNSON AND YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES (1948); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953);
Hudspeth, Separation of Church and State in A4merica, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 1035
(1955); Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 44 (1949); Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment,
62 HARV. L. REv. 1306 (1949).
2 See Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86, 88 (1853); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM 189 (1953); Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and
Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 144-, 148 (1949); Stimson, The
Exemption of Property From Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L REv. 411,
422-23 (1934) ; Note 49 COLUm. L. REV. 968, 992 (1949) ; Comment, 9 STAN. L. REV.
366, 373 (1957).
3 E.g., Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
693, 315 P.2d 394, 407 (1957). "A tax exemption is, obviously, an indirect subsidy."
4 See Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956) ; Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) ; Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644, 298 P.2d 1
(1956), appeal dismissed for wvant of a substantial federal question sub nom;
Comment, 9 STAN. L. REV. 366 (1957). State court decisions uniformly hold church
exemptions not to be violative of state constitutional barriers. Garrett Biblical
Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928) ; Trustees of
Griswold College v. State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. Rep. 138 (1877).
5 Constitutional provisions in thirty-three states expressly provide for ex-
emption of church (and other) property.
In fifteen states, the constitutional language is mandatory in form. ALA.
CogsN. art. IV, § 91; ARIC. CONST. art. 16, § 5; KAN. CoNS?. art. 11, § I; Ky.
CONST. § 170; LA. CONsr. art. X, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.J. CoNsr.
art. 8, § 1, par. 2; N.M. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 3; N.Y. CoNs?. art. XVI, § 1;
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 176; OKLA. CONs?. art. X, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 4;
S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6; UTAH CONsT. art. XIII, § 2; VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 183.
In another fifteen states, the church exemption is permissive. ARIz. CONS?.
art. 9, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VII, § 2-5404; ILL. CONST.
art. IX, § 3; IND. CONs?. art. 10, § 1; Mo. CONsr. art. X, § 6; MONT. CONST.
art. XII, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; NEv. CONs?. art. 8, § 2; N.C. CONST.
art. 5, § 5; OHIO CoNST. art. XII, § 2; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; TENN. CONST.
art. II, § 28; TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; W.VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
In Colorado, the constitution declares that church and other types of
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exemptions, however, have their historical roots in antiquity.0 In modern
times they appear to be traceable to the general immunity from taxation
which colonial and early post-Revolutionary church property enjoyed in
the status of "established" public institutions.' In relatively recent times,
the customary practice has been stabilized in constitutional and statutory
form.
8
The prevalence of church tax exemptions in every American juris-
diction, despite the diversities of historical and cultural experience from
which the nation emerged, strongly suggests that history alone does not
provide an adequate explanation for the phenomenon. Scholars and
critics have repeatedly adverted to the defects in any attempt to develop
a: theoretical rationale for the church exemption by analogy to other
exemptions extended to eleemosynary institutions which, unlike churches,
perform quasi-public functions that government would presumably be
required to assume in their absence.9 Direct governmental propogation
of sectarian doctrine is, of course, forbidden.'0 The proliferation of tax
property "shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by general
law" (COLO. CONST. art. X § 5), thereby incorporating both mandatory and
permissive features. In California and Wyoming, some types of church property
are mandatorily exempt, but the legislatures are expressly authorized to exempt
additional types. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-'A (mandatory), ic (permissive);
WYO. CONST. art. XV, § 12 (both mandatory and permissive).
In the remaining fifteen state constitutions (omitting Alaska and Hawaii),
there are no explicit provisions for exemption of church property, although five
contain general authorizations for legislative grants of property tax exemption.
DEL. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; IDAHO CONsT. art. 7, § 5; MICH. CONsT. art. X, § 3;
WASH. CONsT. art. 7, § 2; Wis. CoNST. art. VIII, § 1. Even in those states where
no express authority to exempt is conferred upon the legislature, statutory ex-
emptions are uniformly sustained as a general exercise of comprehensive legis-
lative power. See, e.g., Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275
(1877) ; Opinion of the Justices, 141 Me. 442, 42 A.2d 47 (1945) ; Mayor etc. of
Baltimore v. Minister and Trustees of Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 106
Md. 281, 67 At. 261 (1907).
6 Instances of favorable tax treatment of the established clergy are reported
in Biblical times. See Genesis 47:26; Ezra 7:24. In the fourth century, Constantine
exempted the Christian ministry from "all personal taxes and contributions, which
pressed on their fellow citizens with intolerable weight." GIBBON, THE DECLINE
AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 301 (Great Books of the Western World ed.,
1952). See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 183 (1953) ; 3 STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950).
7 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 328 (1933). See Franklin Street Soc.
v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342 (1880).
8 See TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171-175
(1948); Note 29 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 121 (1954).
9 Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Organ-
izations, in TAX POLICY LEAGUE, TAX EXEMPTIONS 23 (1939); PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE, AND FREEDOM 186-187 (1953); Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American
Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV. 646 (1916) ; Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 288 (1950).
1 0 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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benefits to churches thus must be regarded in part, at least, as a mani-
festation of a political consensus that aid to organized religion, in non-
discriminatory form at least, has a special tendency to enhance (to use
John Stuart Mill's phrase) "The first element of good government ...
to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves."" In
this capacity, the church exemption has weathered the storms of criti-
cism. 2 and is today more firmly rooted in American tax policy than ever
before.
13
It is here proposed to survey the present constitutional and statutory
law of the United States relating to property tax exemption of church
property, and to examine the ways in which legislative policies have been
judicially applied to various types of church property. Such a study, it is
hoped, may provide some insight into the question of the viability of the
church exemption in a period of increasing pressures for additional
revenue sources, and by underscoring the interplay of legislative drafts-
manship and judicial policy-making may provide a basis for a more
rational evaluation of tax exemption policy.
THE HousE OF WORSHIP
The most universally granted of all exemptions of church property
is that which pertains to the building in which religious services are
regularly celebrated. The statutes' 4 may be roughly classified into five
types.
11 ILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 337 (Great Books of the Western
World ed. 1952.)
12 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM, 185-88 (1953) and references
cited; Mowry, Ought Church Property to be Taxed? 15 GREEN BAY 414 (1903).
13 See 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 427 (1950). In
the absence of express constitutional or statutory language to the contrary, how-
ever, exemptions from taxes do not include special assessments for local benefits.
See, e.g., Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 729,
221 P.2d 31 (1950); City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730,
13 S.E. 252 (1891). Cf. C.A. Wagner Constr. Co. v. Sioux Falls, 71 S.D. 587,
27 N.W.2d 916 (1947).
14 For convenience, the term "statute" will be used herein to refer to both
statutory and constitutional provisions, and the word "state" to refer to the
forty-eight states (omitting Alaska and Hawaii) plus the District of Columbia.
In 33 states (i.e. those without express constitutional provisions governing ex-
emptions, plus those whose constitutions authorize legislative exemptions, supra
note 5, as well as in the District of Columbia, the statutes are, of course, controlling;
but in 12 out of the 15 states with mandatory constitutional exemptions, statutes
have been enacted to implement the exemption. Only in Kentucky, Louisiana and
New Mexico are the exemptions framed solely in constitutional language. Although
it is generally held that the legislature may impose reasonable conditions precedent
to exemption in addition to those set forth in the constitution, see Lutheran Hosp.
Soc. of So. Calif. v. County of Los Angeles, 25 Cal.2d 254-, 153 P.2d 341 (1944);
People v. Anderson, 117 Il1. 50, 7 N.E. 625 (1886), it is beyond the scope of this
paper to examine the extent to which statutes may liberalize the conditions of
exemption or exempt property in addition to what is exempted or authorized to be
1959]
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(a) In twelve jurisdictions, exemption is expressly extended to
property simply described as "houses of public worship,"' 5 "actual places
of religious worship,"' 6 or "churches, meeting houses, or other regular
places of stated worship."' 7 Exemptions framed in descriptive terms of
this type inevitably pose problems of a definitional nature. (b) The most
prevalent statutory test of exemptability is "use," although the type of
use required is not always described in identical terms. Thirteen states
insist that the property be "used exclusively for religious worship,"'
s
while four others, through omission of the adverb "exclusively," suggest
a somewhat less strict policy although continuing to predicate exemption
upon use for religious worship.' 9 In five jurisdictions where exclusivity
of use is required, exemption is predicated upon such use for religious
"purposes,' 20 thereby intimating a broader exemption policy than would
normally be within the connotation of religious "worship." Where
exemption, as in these instances, is focused upon "use," the polices,
operations, programs and activities of the religious organization seeking
exemption necessarily must come under scrutiny. (c) In a handful of
jurisdictions mere ownership by a church or religious society is declared
to be a sufficient basis for exemption; 2 ' while (d) in some twelve juris-
dictions, dual requirements of both ownership and use are imposed. 2
exempted by the constitution. See Annot., 61 A.L.R. 2d 1031 (1958).
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06(4) (1957) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10
(II,G) (Supp. 1957); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 211.7, as amended by PuB. ACTS
1958, ACT 190, p. 219; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 307.140 (1957).
16 GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958); Ky. CONST. § 170; LA. CONST.
art. X, § 4; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-202 (1947) ; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 7150(1) (1951).
1 7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a) (1950). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957), "all churches, built and supported by donations, whose
seats are free to all."
Is ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958) ; CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1-%; CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3(6) (Supp. 1957); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(First) (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(4) (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 137.100(6) (1952); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 57-0208(7) (1943) ; OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.07 (1953) ; S.C. CODE § 16-1522(12)
(1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp.
1958) ; Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-102(G) (Supp. 1957).
19 ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(6) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-206
(Supp. 1957) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(m) (1951). Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3802(4) (1959), "sequestered or used for . . .pious or charitable uses."
20 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958); IOWA CODE
§ 427.1(9) (1958) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 15.2 (Supp. 1957) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 44-3-3(5) (1956) ; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939).
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (1953) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02 (Supp.
1958) ; N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
22 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-81(13), 12-88 (1958), "used exclusively for the
purpose of carrying out [religious worship]"; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2)
(Supp. 1957), "used exclusively for and in connection with public worship"; IND.
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Where ownership by a religious organization is a basis for exemption,
the interpretative problems would seem to revolve mainly around ques-
tions of title (and divided ownership), with some attention to whether
the owner has the attributes and characteristics of a "religious organ-
ization" within the meaning of the statute. (e) In South Carolina, there
being no constitutional prohibition upon special tax exemption legislation,
a long list of exemptions of named institutions, including some churches,
has accumulated over the years through legislative action.2 3 Fortunately
in most states exemptions must be extended on a completely uniform
basis defined in general legislation, 24 thereby avoiding the discriminations
inherent in special legislation of this type.
The statutory variations in the requirements for the church exemp-
tion are reflected in prolific litigation. Despite frequently reiterated
judicial apologetics as to the rule of "strict construction" which attends
tax exemption laws,2 5 perusal of the decisions creates a definite impression
that the explicit statutory language in which the exemption is framed
normally has a great deal more to do with the result in contested cases
(almost invariably cases in which judicial relief is sought following
administrative denial of exemption) than general rubrics. Indeed, re-
liance upon judicial generalizations, without regard for differences in
statutory language, has apparently fostered much litigation which has
proven to be as unavailing as it was avoidable. On the other hand,
lack of adequate legislative draftsmanship has in some cases encouraged
litigation in an effort to obtain favorable interstitial judicial policy-
making, especially where the literal statutory conditions prescribed for
exemption have been out of harmony with accepted functions and
activities of modern religious organizations. As a whole, however, the
courts have responsibly adhered to the legislative policy as either explicitly
ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Sixth) (1951), "used for religious worship"; MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (Eleventh) (Supp. 1958), "appropriated for . . . religious
worship or instruction"; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9697(d) (Supp. 1958), "used ex-
clusively for such [religious] society"; NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-202 (1943), "used
exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes"; NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.125 (1957),
"used for religious worship"; N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6a) (Supp. 1958), "used ex-
clusively for carrying out thereupon . . . such [religious] purposes"; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-296(3) (1958), "wholly and exclusively used for religious worship";
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502 (1955), "occupied . . . exclusively for carrying out
thereupon . . . [religious] purposes"; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (1949), "wholly
and exclusively used for religious worship"; Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955),
"property owned and used exclusively by . . . churches or religious . . .
associations."
23 S.C. CODE § 65-1523 (Supp. 1958). Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 458.106
(1948), exempting property of Baptist church corporations.
24 See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 663 (4th ed. 1924); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 2115 (3rd ed., Horack 1943).
25 E.g., Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 729,
734-35, 221 P.2d 31 (1950). See CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 258
(1940); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 6409 (3rd ed., Horack 1943).
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or implicitly disclosed in the statutory language. A few examples will
suffice to illustrate the point.
Where exemption is conferred upon "houses of religious worship,"
a vacant lot purchased for future erection of a church could not by any
reasonable stretch of the judicial imagination be regarded as exempt,26
although such a lot may qualify for exemption under more broadly
worded statutes.2 7 Similarly, a retreat house, used at intervals for accom-
modating laymen seeking spiritual meditation and refreshment, may be
fully exempt as property used for "religious purposes,""' but (except so
far as a chapel or other sanctuary is maintained) be unable to qualify as
a "house" or an "actual place" of "religious worship." 9 Statutory
language of the latter type, however, is not always more restrictive.
Where a concurrence of ownership and use are requisite to exemption,
a church meeting house used for worship is not exempt if leased from its
owner"° but might qualify for exemption under other statutes as a house
of religious worship, 1 as property used exclusively for public worship, 2
26 Burr v. Boston, 208 Mass. 537, 95 N.E. 208 (1910) ; Boston Soc'y v. Boston,
129 Mass. 178 (1880) ; Trinity Church v. New York, 10 Howard's Practice 138
(N.Y. 185+) ; First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941).
Cf. Philadelphia v. Overbrook Park Congregation, 171 Pa.Super. 581, 91 A.2d 310
(1952).
27 See McGlone v. First Baptist Church, 97 Colo. 427, 50 P.2d 547 (1935),
"lots with the buildings thereon . . . used solely and exclusively for religious
worship"; Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 142 Fla. 657, 195 So.
607 (1940), property "held and used exclusively for religious . . . purposes;"
Commonwealth v. First Christian Church of Louisville, 169 Ky. 410, 183 SA.
943 (1916), "places actually used for religious worship"; State v. Second
Church of Christ, Scientist, 185 Minn. 242, 240 NAV. 532 (1932), "church
property"; In re Assessment of Property of Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church,
202 Okla. 174, 211 P.2d 534 (1949), property used for appropriate purposes of
church owner. But cf. Burbridge v. Smyrna Baptist Church, 212 Ark. 924, 209
S.W.2d 685 (1948), where church had burned down but was not yet rebuilt, un-
used premises held not exempt as property used exclusively for public worship.
28 Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 755, 221 P.2d 59
(1950); People ex rel Outer Court, O.L.C. v. Miller, 161 Misc. 603, 292 N.Y. Supp.
674 (1936), aff'd inem. 256 App. Div. 814, 10 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1939), 280 N.Y. 825,
21 N.E.2d 881 (1939). Cf. Franciscan Fathers v. Town of Pittsfield, 97 N.H. 396,
89 A.2d 752 (1952).
2 9 Town of Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 3 A.2d 232 (1938);
Laymen's Week-End Retreat League v. Butler, 83 Pa. Super. 1 (1924).
3 0 Trustees of St. Paul Methodist Episcopal Church South v. District of
Columbia, 212 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1954); People ex rel Unity Congregational
Soc'y. v. Mills, 189 Misc. 774, 71 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1947); Norwegian Lutheran
Church v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581, 30 P.2d 381 (1934).
31 See Jefferson Standards Life Ins. Co. v. Wildwood, 118 Fla. 771, 160 So.
208 (1935). Cf. Canada West Securities Corp. v. Winnepeg, 1 W.W.R. 788,
66 D.L.R. 591 (Man. 1922).
32 First New Jerusalem Soc'y v. Richardson, 10 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 214, 25 Ohio
Dec. 672 (1910). Cf. Havens v. Alameda County, 30 Cal. App. 206, 157 Pac. 821
(1916). Contra, Commr's. of Cambria Park v. Board of County Comm'rs., 62 Wyo.
446, 174 P.2d 402 (1946).
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or as property used for religious purposes. 3 On the other hand, if the
governing statute speaks in terms of public worship, limitation of partici-
pation in the services to members of a particular religious order may
defeat exemption 34 otherwise available in the absence of the word
"tpublic.""
One of the most exacerbated issues with respect to exemption of
houses of worship arises from the prevalence therein of activities not
constituting actual worship services. Such problems have generally been
treated as calling for a judicial appraisal whether the nonexempt activities
are related to the exempt ones with sufficient directness and to such a
substantial degree as to come within the spirit, if not the precise letter,
of the exemption. Being essentially questions of degree, the lines of
distinction are not always doctrinally clear. Use of part of a church
building for a caretaker's living quarters for example, has been regarded
as incidental and necessary to effective worship, and hence does not
destroy exemption based on "exclusive use" for religious worship; 6 but
similar provision for residential quarters for the minister or parson, even
though used occasionally for religious counselling or ceremonies, has been
regarded as primarily a nonreligious use which precludes exemption."
In view of the expansion of the social, educational and other aux-
iliary functions of churches today, a literal application of the statutory
wording would often be clearly unreasonable. In the words of the
Ohio Supreme Court,"
There are many activities conducted in church buildings
which do not constitute public worship but which are designed
to encourage people to use the church for public worship. The
use of a room in the church to entertain young children while
their parents attend church services is not a use for public
worship. The use of the church building for meetings of boy
scouts is not a use for public worship. The use of part of the
building for the preparation of food for a church supper and
the eating of such food are not uses for public worship.
Certainly it was not the intention of the people that their
33 See Anderson v. Doe, 246 Ala. 398, 20 So. 2d 777 (1945); People ex reL
Bracher v. Salvation Army, 305 Ill. 545, 137 N.E. 430 (1922).
34 See People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234-, 137 N.E. 863 (1922).
Cf. Sisters of Mercy v. Hookset, 93 N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222 (1945).
35 St. Barbara's Roman Catholic Church v. City of New York, 243 App.
Div. 371, 277 N.Y.Supp. 538 (2d Dept. 1935).
36 Shaarai Berocho v. Mayor, etc. of City of New York, 60 N.Y. Super. 479,
18 N.Y.Supp. 792 (1892); In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio
St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
37 Congregation Gedulath Mordecai v. New York, 135 Misc. 823, 238
N.Y.Supp. 525 (Munic. Ct. 1929) ; Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d
233 (1948).
3 8 1n re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 72-73, 84
N.E.2d 270, 272 (1949), per Taft, J.
1959]
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words, "used exclusively for public worship," should be so
literally construed that any such uses would prevent tax ex-
emption of a church building.
Cases in other jurisdictions under comparable statutory language are in
agreement with these views,89 as are the decisions applying the somewhat
more liberal requirement of exdusive use for religious "purposes". 
40
Indeed, there appears to be a consensus that, in the absence of express
statutory language to the contrary, permissive use, or even a renting out,
of a church meeting house for occasional activities such as town meetings
or community social gatherings, which historically constituted an im-
portant function of early church meeting houses, 4 1 will not alter the
status of the church building from that of an exempt "house of
worship"142 nor mitigate the exclusiveness of its religious use.43  In
earlier days, particularly in New England,
The church-commonly called the "Meetinghouse"--was
customarily used for town meetings, lectures, concerts, temper-
ance meetings, political addresses, and for other like special
occasions; and no one ever supposed that such use made the
meetinghouse liable to taxation.
44
Under statutes which require "ownership" by a religious institution,
organization or corporation as a condition of exemption, a determination
that the owner is in the requisite class is of crucial significance. Thus,
ownership by an individual, even though in trust for a church, does not
qualify where the statute contemplates ownership by a "religious associ-
39 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
315 P.2d 394 (1957), use for civic meetings, political discussions, lectures, social
gatherings, dances and dinners; In re Walker, 200 Ill. 566, 66 N.E. 144 (1903),
cloakrooms, classrooms, offices and studies.
40 Syracuse Center of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Syracuse, 163 Misc. 535, 297
N.Y.Supp. 587 (Sup. Ct. 1937), incidental use as home and shelter for missionaries,
students and gospel workers; St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 R.I. 307 (1885),
incidental use for educational purposes; Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hinton,
92 Tenn. 188, 21 S.W. 321 (1893), sale of religious literature in church. If the
religious activities are incidental to a primarily non-religious use, and appear to
constitute a subterfuge to avoid taxes, of course the exemption is denied. See
People ex rel Autokefalos Orthodox Spiritual Church v. Hallahan, 200 Misc. 221,
105 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd mem. 278 App. Div. 947, 105 N.Y.S.2d
980 (2d Dept. 1951).
41 See ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 345-46 (1933).
42 First Unitarian Society v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368, 34 Atd. 89 (1895)
St. Paul's Church v. Concord, 75 N.H. 420, 75 At]. 531 (1910); Chevra Achewa
Chesed Anshe Cheval v. Philadelphia, 116 Pa. Super. 101, 176 Atd. 779 (1935);
Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 42 (1878).
43 Assessors of Framingham v. First Parish, 329 Mass. 212, 107 N.E.2d 309
(1952). If the nonreligious activities are of a permanent and continuing nature,
however, the exemption may be lost. See First Congregational Church of Fort
Collins v. Wright, 110 Colo. 135, 131 P.2d 419 (1942).




ation." 45 It has been said, for example, that a religious society is "an
association or body of communicants or a church usually meeting in some
stated place for worship or for instruction, or organized for the accom-
plishment of religious purposes," and a one-man evangelistic corporation
does not come within this meaning.4 6
There is general agreement that the church exemption must be
granted all qualified recipients on a non-discriminatory basis and without
regard for sectarian or denominational differences." The borderline
between religion, on the one hand, and philosophy or metaphysics, on
the other, however, is uncertain at best.4" May a philosophical society
qualify for exemption as a "religious" organization? If its physical
attributes and activities approximate those of a social club, rather than a
church, denial of exemption appears to be reasonably in accord with
legislative policy.49 But what of an association of humanists which holds
regular meetings characterized -by scriptural readings, sermons, meditation
and singing designed to promote ethical and spiritual values, but which
nonetheless does not espouse, revere, teach the existence of nor worship
any Supreme or Divine Being? In two recent decisions from opposite
ends of the nation the same answer has been given: belief in or worship
of deity is not essential to the status of a religious society.50 Referring
to the constitutional inviolability of religious beliefs, the earlier of the
two opinions expressed the view51 that:
. . . The only valid test a state may apply in determining
the tax exemption . . . is the objective one of whether or not
the belief occupies the same place in the lives of its holders
that the orthodox beliefs occupy in the lives of believing
majorities, and whether a given group that claims the exemp-
tion conducts itself the way groups conceded to be religious
45 Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.W. 745 (1899). Cf. Common-
wealth v. First Christian Church, 169 Ky. 410, 183 S.W. 943 (1916).
46 Mordecai F. Ham Evangelistic Ass'n. v. Matthews, 300 Ky. 402, 408, 189
S.W.2d 524, 527 (1945).
47 See, e.g., Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d
673, 691-92, 315 P.2d 394, 405 (1957), "It is perfectly obvious that any type of
statutory exemption that discriminates between types of religious belief-that
discriminates on the basis of the content of such belief-would offend both the
federal and state constitutional provisions."
48 See Silving, The Unknown and the Unknowable in Law, 35 CALIF. L. REV.
352 (1947).
49 See In re Peace Haven, 175 Misc. 753, 755, 25 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (Sup.Ct.
1941), in which the court observed that plaintiff, an association of persons inter-
ested in metaphysics, "has no tenets, ritual, dogma, or other characteristics of a
religious organization except, possibly, the solicitation and receipt of funds."
50 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315
P.2d 394 (1957); Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d
127 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
51 Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
692, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957).
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conduct themselves. The content of the belief, under such
test, is not a matter of governmental concern.
CHURCH LAND
In most of the statutes exempting church buildings from taxation,
express provision is made for also exempting the adjacent land.5 2 Dis-
regarding minor verbal differences, the legislative policy enunciated in
these statutes usually limits the exemption to land "appurtenant" to the
house of worship,53 land upon which the church "stands" or "is situ-
ated," 4 or adjacent land necessary for proper occupancy, use and
enjoyment of the church.55 In some eleven states, 6 in addition, a maxi-
52 In addition to the provisions cited, infra notes 52-57, many exemption
laws which do not explicitly refer to the land surrounding the house of worship
are worded broadly enough to exempt such land. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2
(Supp. 1958), "all property, real and personal, used exclusively for religious
worship"; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3(6) (Supp. 1957), semble; CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 12-81 (1958), semble; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (1953),
"property . . . owned by . . . any church"; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp.
1957), semble; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958), "all
property used exclusively for religious purposes"; IOWA CODE § 427.1(9) (1958),
"grounds and buildings used ... for [religious] . . . objects"; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 272.02(5) (Supp. 1958), "churches, church property, and houses of worship";
MIss. CODE ANN. § 9697(d) (Supp. 1958), "all property, real or personal . . . used
exclusively . . ."; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.100(6) (1952), semble; NE. REy. STAT.
§ 77-202(c) (1943), "property . . . used exclusively for . . . religious . . . pur-
poses"; N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, "all church property"; N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6a)
(Supp. 1958), "real property"; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1512(7) (Supp. 1957), "all
property"; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939), "all property"; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-502(2) (1955), "real estate"; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958),
"property, real and personal"; WIs. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955).
53ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(6) (1956); Ky. CONST. § 170; LA. CONST.
art. X, § 4; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(4) (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3832 (1959). Cf. S.C. CODE
§ 65-1522(12) (1952), "all houses used exclusively for public worship . . . [and]
the ground actually occupied by them."
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Sixth)
(1951) ; MicH. COMP. LAWS § 211.7 (Fifth), as amended by PUB. ACTS 1958, AcT
190, p. 219; NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.125 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp.
1958) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(3) (1958) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 57-02-98(7)
(1943); ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.140(1) (1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3(5)
(1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp.
1957); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-102(G) (Supp. 1957). Cf. KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 79-201 (First) (1949), "buildings used exclusively as places of public
worship . . . together with the grounds owned thereby."
55ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84.206 (First) (Supp. 1957); CAL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 1-y; OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.07 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a)
(1950); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (1949). Cf. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(r)
(1951), "grounds belonging to and reasonably required and actually used. ... "
56 ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 91, 1 acre in city, 5 acres in country; IND. ANN.
STAT. § 64-201 (Sixth) (1951), 15 acres; IOWA CODE § 427.1(9) (1958), 320 acres;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (First) (1949), 10 acres; KY. CONST. § 170,
acre in city, 2 acres in country; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958),
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mum acreage limitation upon the exemption is imposed, ranging from
one-half acre in Kentucky5" to 320 acres in Iowa.55
Cases determining claims to exemption of land under statutes of
this type appear to be based less upon judicial appraisal of factual circum-
stances involved than upon the particular language of the applicable
statute. For example, in several states where the respective constitutions
authorized legislative exemption only of "houses used exclusively for
public worship"" 9 or "actual places of religious worship," 6 the courts
have upheld statutes which purported to exempt both the church meeting-
house and "the grounds attached to such buildings necessary for the
proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment" thereof;61 but, in view of the
rather narrow constitutional basis for such an enlarged exemption, have
generally taken a parsimonious attitude as to how much property is
"necessary" for occupancy and enjoyment." On the other hand, in
Kentucky, where the constitution expressly exempts the grounds "at-
tached and used and appurtenant to the house of worship, not exceeding
one-half acre," 6 3 the evident constitutional largesse has fortified the
5 acres; N.D. REv. CODE § 57-0208(9) (Supp. 1957), 2 acres; R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. § 44-3-3(5) (1956), 1 acre; S.C. CODE § 65-1522(13) (1952), 2 acres;
S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939), up to 80 acres of agricultural land; WASH. REv.
CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957), 5 acre maximum, but "unoccupied ground" ex-
empted "shall not exceed the equivalent of one hundred-twenty by one hundred-
twenty feet."
57 Ky. CONsT. § 170.
5 IOWA CODE § 427.1(9) (1958).
59 E.g., OHIO CoNs. art. XII, § 2.
60 E.g., PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1; Tx. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2.
61 OHIo REv. CODE § 5709.07 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a)
(1950); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150 (1951). See Gerke v. Purcell,
25 Ohio St. 229 (1874) ; First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 34-1 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d
209 (1941) ; City of Houston v. Cohen, 204 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
62 See Congregational Union v. Zangerle, 138 Ohio St. 246, 34 N.E.2d 201
(1941), lot adjacent to church building, and under different ownership, on which
church members were permitted to park their cars and church was permitted to
maintain a bulletin board, held "convenient" to use of church but not exempt
because not "necessary" thereto; Wynnefield United Presbyterian Church v.
Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 252, 35 A.2d 276 (1944), vacant 5 foot lot adjoining
church held not necessary for ingress and egress, or for light and air, where
15 foot strip lying between church and lot appeared to be sufficient for the purpose
and hence was exempted; First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d
209 (1941), unused two-thirds of lot adjoining church held not exempt since not
"necessary" to occupancy and enjoyment; court points out that lot was located in
the rear of the church "at a point where there is the least need for light, air and
approach"; Grace Methodist Episcopal Church v. Philadelphia, 41 Pa. County Ct.
703 (1913), semble. But cf. City of Houston v. Cohen, 204 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947), to be exempt, lands attached to church need not be absolutely neces-
sary to use of meeting house, but only reasonably necessary for light, air, access
and ornamentation.
63 Ky. CONST. § 170.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
interpretative liberality of the judiciary. 4 Similarly, in North Carolina
where exemption was expressly granted not only to the land on which a
church building was "situated" but also to "additional adjacent land
reasonably necessary for the convenient use of any such building,"6 5 the
apparent intent of the latter phrase, as contrasted with the former, to
expand the scope of exempted land beyond the immediate curtilage of
the church supported exemption of a lot several blocks distant from the
over-crowded church building, which was intended for future con-
struction of a new edifice but was presently used as an open air annex
for Sunday School classes and other overflow services." In still other
jurisdictions, the requirement that the adjacent land be "necessary" to
convenient use and occupation of the church has been invoked to deny
exemption in order to promote collateral policies, such as provisions for
sanitary water and sewage facilities in churches,0 7 or maintenance of
equal competitive conditions for landowners engaged in revenue pro-
ducing activities.6" Conversely, the elimination of traffic congestion and
overcrowded street parking conditions has justified decisions exempting
church parking lots as "necessary" to use of the church building for
worship.6
9
In a minority of states, as indicated above, the exemption laws
contain no express provisions as to the tax status of the land on which
the church building stands.70 One court, faced with this type of statute,
found sufficient indications of legislative intent, bolstered by the expressio
un;us rule, to conclude that exemption of "houses of public worship" did
not apply to any land either beneath or adjacent to a church building. 7 1
64 See City of Louisville v. Werne, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2196, 80 S.W. 224 (1904),
holding lands in rear of church, unused except for two coal sheds and which were
within the acreage limit, to be exempt on ground the whole lot was appurtenant to
the house of worship and used with it by the congregation.
65 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(3) (1958).
06 Harrison v. Guilford County, 218 N.C. 718, 12 S.E.2d 269 (1940), indi-
cating that in view of the statutory language, "adjacent land" must lie close, but
not necessarily be contiguous, to the lot on which the church is situated.
67 Pulaski County v. First Baptist Church, 86 Ark. 205, 110 S.W. 1034 (1908).
08 Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
69 Immanuel Presbyterian Church v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176, 265 Pac. 547
(1928); Congregation B'nai Yisroel v. Township of Millburn, 35 N.J. Super. 67,
113 A.2d 182 (1955); First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d
209 (1941). But ef. Congregational Union v. Zangerle, 138 Ohio St. 246, 34
N.E.2d 201 (1941). Subsequent to the Immanuel Presbyterian Church case, supra,
the California Code was amended to expressly exempt church parking lots under
prescribed conditions. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 206.1. Cf. ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 307.140(2) (1957).
70 GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A,
§ 10(IIA) (Supp. 1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 59, § 5 (Eleventh) (Supp. 1958);
MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 84-202 (1947); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(1)
(1951).
71 Lefevre v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586 (1853), relying on the fact that the same
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In the absence of such negative implications, however, the courts have
uniformly agreed that exemption of a church building includes by impli-
cation the land on which the building stands together with such adjoining
land as is reasonably necessary to the convenient use, occupation and
enjoyment thereof.7"
As seen above, in nearly every jurisdiction the exemption of church
land is directly dependent upon its use in conjunction with an exempt
church building, whether by express statutory direction or by judicial
implication. In either event, the relationship to the building is crucial;
and in the absence of statutory language to the contrary73 a vacant lot,
not so related, is quite properly denied exemption despite an admitted
bona fide intent to erect a church thereon in the future.74 By the same
token, land on which a church is being constructed but which is not yet
in use and hence is not yet exempt as a house of worship cannot
qualify." As is typical of all exemptions, however, the statutory language
may justify a contrary result, as, for example, where exemption is not
predicated upon use 76 or where it is expressly allowed to buildings under
construction. 77
statute carefully identified adjacent land as exempt in conjunction with other
exempted improvements.
72Third Congregational Soc'y v. Springfield, 147 Mass. 396, 18 N.E. 68
(1888) ; Trinity Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164 (1875). Cf. Gerke v. Purcell,
25 Ohio St. 229 (1874); City of Houston v. Cohen, 204 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
73 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(r) (2) (1951), exempting vacant land
owned by a church prior to July 1, 1942 and held for enlargement or expansion
in the future; IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Fifth) (1951), semble.
74 Grace Calvary Church v. City and County of Denver, 130 Colo. 290,
274 P.2d 983 (1954) ; Enaut v. McGuire, 36 La. Ann. 804 (1884) ; All Saints
Parish v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 178 Mass. 404, 59 N.E. 1003 (1901); Enochs
v. Jackson, 144 Miss. 360, 109 So. 864 (1926). See Boston Soc'y of Redemptorist
Fathers v. City of Boston, 129 Mass. 178 (1880) ; Parnassus v. Parnassus United
Presbyterian Church, 43 Pa. County Ct. 142 (1915). But cf. McGlone v. First
Baptist Church, 97 Colo. 427, 50 P.2d 547 (1935).
75 See First Baptist Church v. County of Los Angeles, 113 Cal. App. 2d 392,
248 P.2d 101 (1952); Trinity Reformed Church v. Philadelphia, 23 Pa. D. & C.
343 (1914); Mullen v. Comm'rs of Erie County, 85 Pa. 288 (1877). Cf. Good
Samaritan Hospital Ass'n v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 507, 99 N.E.2d 473 (1951).
Following the First Baptist Church decision, supra, the California Constitution
was amended to exempt buildings in the course of erection where "the same is
intended to be used solely and exclusively for religious worship." CAL. CONST.
art. XIII, § I-/, as amended Nov. 4, 1952.
76 See Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 142 Fla. 657, 195
So. 607 (1940), church building site held exempt as property "held . . . exclusively
for religious purposes"; Trinity Church v. Boston, 11S Mass. 164 (1875), church
under construction to replace old one destroyed by fire is exempt under statute
exempting "houses of religious worship," since appropriation to sacred uses, rather
than actual present use or condition for such use, is required for exemption;
State v. Second Church of Christ, Scientist, 185 Minn. 242, 240 N.W. 532 (1932),
church building site held exempt as "church property," where present use for
worship was not required as a condition of exemption.
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TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF CHURCHES
Although one authority flatly declares that church personal property
devoted to religious uses is everywhere exempt from taxation,7" the law
is by no means that uniform. In some 18 states the statutory exemption
is worded broadly enough to embrace church personalty as well as
realty, 79 while in at least 3 jurisdictions church personalty shares the
benefits of a general exemption of all tangible personal property.
8 0
The statutory provisions in the remaining states fall roughly into two
general categories, (a) statutes which are silent as to exemption of such
personalty, making provision solely for exemption of real property,8 and
(b) statutes expressly exempting described classes of tangible personal
property, thereby impliedly excluding other forms of such property from
the privilege.
8 2
7 See, e.g., Board of Foreign Missions of Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816 (1926).
7 8 PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 184 (1953).
7 9 ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958), "property, real and personal"; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3 (6) (Supp. 1957), semble; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81
(12) (1958), "personal property"; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1957),
"property"; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 272.02(5) (Supp. 1958), "church property"; MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 9697(d) (Supp. 1958), "property, real or personal"; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.100
(6) (1952), "property, real and personal"; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 84-202
(1947), "property"; NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-202(lc) (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957), "real estate and personal property"; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), "buildings .. . furniture and personal property"; N.M.
CONST. art. VIII, § 3, "all church property"; N.D. REV. CODE § 57-0208 (Supp.
(1957), "all real property . . . [and] all personal property"; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68,
§ 15.2 (Supp. 1957), "all property"; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939), "all prop-
erty"; TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(2) (1955), "real estate . . . and the personal
property"; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(4) (1959), "real and personal estate";
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958), "property"; Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4)
(1955), "property."
80 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8102 (1953) ; N.Y. TAX LAW § 3; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 5020-201 (Supp. 1958).
81 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84.206 (First) (Supp. 1957); CAL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 1 ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(m) (1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp.
1958); IOWA CODE § 427.1 (1958); Ky. CONST. § 170; LA. CONST. art. X, § 4;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3 (5) (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-102(G)
(Supp. 1957).
82 E.g., ARIEZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(6), "furniture and equipment"; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 192.06 (1957), "pews or steps and furniture"; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 64-201 (Sixth) (1951), "pews and furniture"; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(1949), "furniture and books"; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(II G) (Supp.
1957), "pews and furniture"; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9 (1957), "furniture";
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (Eleventh) (Supp. 1958), "pews and furniture";
MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 211.7, as amended by PuB. AcTs. AcT 190, p. 219, "furniture";
NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.125 (1957), "furniture and equipment"; N.C. GEE. STAT.
§ 105-297(2) (1958), "furniture and furnishings"; OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.07
(1953), "books and furniture"; ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.140 (1957), "furniture";
TAX EXEMPTION
Where personal property is expressly exempted, the chief inter-
pretative problems have been analogous to those arising with respect to
allegedly exempt realty, as, for example, whether the personal assets are
used exclusively for religious purposes.83 Where specified categories of
personalty are declared exempt, occasional decisions adumbrate the
boundaries of the statutory classes with respect to various types of personal
property. 4 Legal problems under statutes of these types are minimal.
Absent express exempting language, however, the general rule in
favor of uniform taxation requires any exemption of church personalty
to be supported by implication drawn from the statutory language.
Where the statutory language speaks only in terms of exemption of
real property, therefore, the obstacle is indeed a formidable one, even
apart from the inhibitory influence of the expressio unius canon. In
denying exemption to religious books and pamphlets stored in an exempt
building and used for missionary purposes, under a provision expressly
extending exemption to "all buildings, and . . . the real property on
which they are situated" used exclusively for religious worship, the
California Supreme Court opined"3 that:
by no stretch of the imagination may the term "building"
include the personal property here taxed although it is assumed
that it is used for the exercise of religion as well as the
building in which it is stored.
The court pointed out, however, that the taxed personalty would pre-
sumably be eligible for exemption under a different statutory provision,8
6
not in effect at the time of the assessment in question, exempting
"property used exclusively for religious . . . purposes," without dis-
tinction between realty and personalty.
Apart from the California decision cited, there has been a dearth
of reported cases in which efforts have been made to obtain exemption
of church tangible personal property in the absence of express ex-
S.C. CODE, § 65-1522(12) (1952) "books and furniture"; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951), "books and furniture"; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2)
(1949), "furniture and furnishings".
83 See Congregational Sunday School & Pub. Soc. v. Board of Review, 290
Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919) ; Sunday School Bd. of the So. Baptist Convention v.
McCue, 179 Kan. 1, 293 P.2d 234 (1956) ; Assessors v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166,
55 N.E.2d 215 (1944); Gunter v. Jackson, 130 Miss. 637, 94 So. 844 (1923);
Dawn Bible Students Ass'n. v. Borough of East Rutherford, 3 N.J. Super. 71,
65 A.2d 532 (1949).
84 See State Tax Comm'n v. Whitehall Foundation, Inc., 214 Md. 316, 135
A.2d 298 (1957), animals for experimental purposes held exempt as "equipment";
Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City v. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 321 (1878),
library, furniture and sacramental vessels of church seminary held exempt as
gequipment."
85 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d
426, 428, 182 P.2d 178, 1So (1947), cert. den. 332 U.S. 811 (1947).
80 CAL. REV. & TA-. CODE § 214.
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empting language. This phenomenon may be attributed to various
factors-lack of sufficient financial interest at stake to justify litigation
expense, or legal advice as to futility of suit, for example. There is
also the possibility that actual administrative practices of taxing officials
may make litigation unnecessary. In the Watchtower case, the plaintiff
religious society urged the court to take judicial notice, as "a matter of
common knowledge," that pews, altars and other paraphernalia of
religious worship were generally not taxed in California. The court
replied, "We have no such knowledge and we are not justified in in-
dulging in such an assumption.""7 This, of course, is not a denial of
the truth of the plaintiff's contention. 8 This may well be an area in
which actual taxing practices are more revealing than volumes of
enacted law. Even where efforts are made to place nonexempt church
personalty on the tax rolls, it is probable that assessed values are often
fixed at relatively nominal levels in view of the single-purpose use and
lack of an easily identifiable market value for certain kinds of implements
of worship.
CHURCH ENDOWMENT AND INTANGIBLES
In view of the prevalence of endowments for religious, charitable
and educational purposes, it is somewhat surprising to find that relatively
few tax exemption statutes make explicit provision for them. Only
eleven states specifically confer exemption upon endowments for church
or religious purposes, 9 although in at least eight other states, they are
apparently included (although not specifically and perhaps only partially)
in broadly phrased statutes exempting endowments, moneys, credits and
other investments of "charitable," "benevolent" or "educational" in-
stitutions." The terms of these statutes differ in certain minor respects,
87 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d
426, 429, 182 P.2d 178, 180 (1947).
88The author's personal experience and observation support the belief that
in Los Angeles County, at least, no effort is made by the assessor to tax personalty
located within and used as part of the equipment and facilities of exempt church
buildings. This practice may be partially justiied in that the cost of assessment,
equalization, billing and collection would in all likelihood exceed the potential
additional tax revenue to be gained, and that exemption of such personalty could
easily be obtained by the churches in question merely by satisfying the formal
but substantially more onerous requirements attendant on the "welfare" exemption.
See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 214, 254.5.
89 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(12) (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp.
1958) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Fifth) (1951) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201
(Fourth) (1949); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 59, § 5 (Tenth) (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-3.7 (1940); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-297(4) (1958); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 5709.04 (1953) ; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-3-3(7) (1956) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (1949).
90 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84.206 (Seventh) (Supp. 1957); "moneys and credits
appropriated solely to sustaining and belonging exclusively to . . . institutions
[of purely public charity]"; IDAHO CODE AN. § 63-105(13) (Supp. 1957),
"property . . . used exclusively for endowment . . . of schools or educational
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but in the main they expressly relieve from taxation only endowments
consisting of or invested in assets other than real estate; and in several
instances, clearly negate any intent to exempt assets invested in real
property.
91
Even in the absence of explicit language, the courts have construed
general statutory exemptions of "endowments" as limited to funds or
other personal assets yielding income, thereby excluding real property.
9 2
Conversely, the courts have refused to permit express exemptions of
personal property endowment to extend to real property purchased with
the proceeds of sale thereof.9" In general, of course, the conditions and
scope of exemption granted by statutes of the foregoing types depend
chiefly upon the language in which the exemption is formulated. 94
The balance of the states make no explicit provision for exemption
of church endowments, and reliance must be placed upon other ex-
emption provisions. In a few instances, 95 a general exemption is granted
to all church property in unconditional and comprehensive terms which
clearly include endowments of all types. In other states, the eligibility
of such invested assets depends upon the particular language of the
statutes and, in part, the judicial attitude toward exemptions. Stocks,
bonds, notes or other forms of intangible investments for example,
institutions"; ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 120, § 500(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958), semble;
KY. CONST. § 170, "institutions of purely public charity . . . and . . . their endow-
ments"; N.D. CODE § 57-0208(8) (1943), "moneys and credits appropriated solely
to sustaining and belonging exclusively to . . . institutions [of public Charity]";
S.C. CODE § 65-1522 (1952), "institutions of learning, with the funds provided
for their support"; S.D. ConE § 57.0311(2), "property used exclusively by and
for the support of ... [any educational] institution"; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 678(a)
(Supp. 1958), "property . . . held in trust for . . . educational . . .purposes,
including annuities, money".
9 1 E.g., MASS. ANN LAW: ch. 59, § 5 (Tenth) (1953), "personal property";
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150 (1951), "endowment funds . . . invested in
bonds or mortgages."
92 See Millsaps College v. City of Jackson, 136 Miss. 795, 101 So. 574 (1924),
aff'd 275 U.S. 129 (1927); Rosedale Cemetery Ass'n v. Linden Township, 73 N.J.L.
421, 63 At. 904 (1906); State v. Krollman, 38 N.J.L. 323 (1876), aff'd 38 N.J.L.
574 (1876) ; Appeal of Wagner Free Institute of Science, 116 Pa. 555, 11 AtI. 402
(1887) ; Harris v. City of Fort Worth, 142 Tex. 600, 180 S.W.2d 131 (1944).
Cf. State v. Silverthorn, 52 N.J.L. 73, 19 AIT. 124 (1889), holding a real property
mortgage to be exempt as endowment. Contra, Louisville v. Werne, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
2196, 80 S.W. 224 (1904).
93 First Unitarian Church v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368, 34 At. 89 (1895).
94 Assessors of Boston v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166, 55 N.E.2d 215, Annot., 154
A.L.R. 886 (1944), holding exemption of "personal property .. . held in trust ...
for religious organizations .. . if the principal or income is used or appropriated
for religious . . .purposes" applicable to trust property used to publish Christian
Science Monitor and other religious literature.
9 5 E.g., MICH. Comp. LAWs § 211.9, as amended by PuB. AcTs 1958, ACT 209,
p. 272, "personal property of benevolent, charitable .. . institutions"; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 272.02 (Supp. 1958), "All ... church property."
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would not be exmpt as "land,""6 but might qualify as "property" used
exclusively for religious purposes where all of the income is devoted to
such purposes.9" In Kentucky, endowments for the establishment and
maintenance of exempt institutions of charity are themselves exempt as
"institutions of purely public charity,"9 " but due to a difference in the
language of the church exemption provision, endowments to finance
religious worship are not exempt.9 9 In some states, statutory provisions
expressly deny exemption to otherwise qualified church property if in-
come or revenue is derived therefrom;1° ° and in the absence of language
relieving endowments from the application of such a non-profit clause,
a denial of exemption may obtain even where all of the income or
revenue is applied to religious or other exempt purposes.1 '
The absence of express exemption of church endowments, as such,
in the statute law of most of the states'0 2 should not be considered as
necessarily implying taxability of such endowments. Many states, al-
though not expressly referring to endowments, confer exemption upon
intangible property of religious organizations, 0 3 while in others, exemp-
tion is accorded intangibles either generally 0 4 or of specified types, 0 5
96Inhabitants of Gorham v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund, 109 Me. 22, 82
Atd. 290 (1912).
97 See Yates v. Board of Review, 312 Ill. 367, 144 N.E. 1 (1924); Central
Bank & Trust Co. v. Yancey County, 195 N.C. 678, 143 S.E. 252 (1928) ; United
Brethren v. Forsyth County, 115 N.C. 489, 20 S.E. 626 (1894).
9S Louisville v. Presbyterian Orphan Home Soc'y, 299 Ky. 566, 186 S.W.2d
194 (1945) ; Commonwealth v. Parr's Ex'r., 167 Ky. 46, 179 S.W. 1048 (1915);
Norton's Ex'rs. v. Louisville, 118 Ky. 836, 82 S.W. 621 (1904); Commonwealth
v. Pollitt, 25 Ky.L.Rep. 790, 76 S.W. 412 (1903).
99 See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 119 Ky. 208, 214, 83 S.W. 572, 574 (1904),
in which the court held that an endowment for propagation of primitive Christi-
anity was not exempt as a "place actually used for religious worship," and could
not properly be regarded as an "institution of purely public charity" because "if
the language 'purely public charity' embraces any part of the property of a
sectarian denomination, it embraces it all, and it is entirely useless to specify the
exemption of a house of worship ... ." Cf. Corbin Young Men's Christian Ass'n.
v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 384, 205 S.W. 388 (1918).
00 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958); OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.07
(1953) ; S.C. CODE § 65-1522(12) (1952).
101 See Ministerial Fund v. Gloucester, 19 Pick. 542 (Mass. 1837) ; Presby-
terian Church v. Montgomery County, 3 Grant 245 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1858).
102 In some states, there is an express denial of exemption to endowments.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (1953), no exemption if property is "held by
way of investment"; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.100(6) (1952), "the exemption herein
granted shall not include real property . . . held or used as investment even
though the income or rentals received therefrom be used wholly for religious,
educational or charitable purposes."
103 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 199.02(5) (1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-130
(Supp. 1958); INn. ANN. STAT. § 64-942 (1951); MICH. ComP. LAws § 205.133
(Supp. 1956); OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.04 (1953).
104 E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 138-1-48 (1953) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.030
(1957); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.070 (1951).
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irrespective of ownership. In still other jurisdictions, where no intangi-
bles exemption obtains, the rate of tax on such property is nominal."0 6
Prudent management of endowment assets in the light of local statutory
language may thus serve to minimize or avoid altogether the burden
of ad valorem tax liability thereon.
LIVING QUARTERS FOR CLERGYMEN AND CHURCH PERSONNEL
In 29 states' 0 7 and the District of Columbia," 8 statutory provision
is made for tax exemption of clergymen's living quarters. In some of
these statutes, exemption is simply granted to "parsonages" as such,
without further qualification.'0 9 Many of them additionally require
both ownership by a church or religious society and actual use as a
residence by the officiating minister."0 Others insist on the element of
church ownership or residential use, but not both."' In some, a maxi-
mum valuation is prescribed as the limit of the parsonage exemption.11
2
The land occupied by the parsonage is usually, but not always, desig-
105E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 212, notes, stocks, bonds, debentures,
mortgages, deeds of trust; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105 (Supp. 1957), bank deposits,
credits secured by mortgages or trust deeds; NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.235 (1957),
corporate stock exempt to extent corporation is taxed on its property or capital;
WvYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 33-112, mortgages, § 44-125, corporate shares.
1 0 6 E.g., IOWA CODE § 429.2 (1958) ; 5 mills; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3109
(1949), 5 mills; Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.030 (1959), 1 mill; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 146.020 (1952), 4% of yield during previous year; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-702,
77-703 (1958), 2-Y2 mills on class A intangibles, 4 mills on class B.
107 See notes 108-10 infra.
108D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(O) (1951).
100 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06 (1957); S.C. COnE § 65-1522(12) (1952);
WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp.
1958).
110 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. q 84-207 (1947) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-124
(Supp. 1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(15) (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201
(Supp. 1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(2) (Supp. 1957); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 64-201 (Sixth) (1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (1949); KY. CONST.
§ 170; LA. CONST. art. X, § 4; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(11 G) (Supp.
1957); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 211.7 (Fifth), as amended by Pu. AcTs 1958, ACT
190, p. 219; N.Y. TAx LAW § 4(8) (Supp. 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105.296(3)
(1958); N.D. REV. CODE § 57-0208(7) (1943); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-3-3 (6)
(1956); TEx. REV. C11. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 3802(4) (1959); VA. ConE ANN. § 53-12 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955).
111 MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(4) (1957), "any parsonage used in con-
nection with" house of worship; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1958),
"parsonages so owned"; NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.125 (1957), "parsonages so
owned"; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957), "parsonages occupied
by their pastors"; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958) ; "building actually
occupied as a parsonage"; WYo. CoxIP. STAT. ANN. § 32-102(G) (Supp. 1957),
"used exclusively for church parsonages."
112 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-124 (Supp. 1957), $6,000; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(II G) (Supp. 1957), $6,000; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5
(Supp. 1958), $10,000; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), $5,000; R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3 (6) (1956), $10,000.
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nated by statute as exempt,' and such designation presumably includes
such additional adjacent land as is reasonably necessary for convenient
use and occupation.114 However, as in the case of houses of worship,
the statutes expressly exempting parsonages, save in a few instances,"'
are remarkably devoid of language, dearly indicating whether personal
property is included within the exemption." 16
Express parsonage exemptions have given rise to relatively little
litigation. The few reported decisions suggest that recourse to the
judiciary has usually been taken either in an effort to secure the benefit
of the parsonage exemption for property which, at least prima facie,
does not appear to be a "parsonage" within the meaning of the statute,
or to secure a judicial waiver of some unsatisfied requirement for the
exemption. The former category includes unsuccessful efforts to bring
within the parsonage exemption property used as a residence for ordained
ministers engaged as instructors in a school of Christian education, n 7
and property used by ministers and laymen as a temporary sojourn while
observing a religious retreat. 18 Cases of the latter type are exemplified
by an unavailing effort to secure exemption for a parsonage building
owned by a church which was leased for use as a private residence and
thus was not "actually occupied . . . by the pastor . . . of a church" as
113 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-4 (Supp. 1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201
(Sixth) (1951) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (1949) ; Ky. CONsr. § 170; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:23 (Supp. 1957);
N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(8) (Supp. 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(3) (1958);
N.D. REV. CODE § 57-0208(7) (1943) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3(6) (1956);
S.C. CODE § 65-1522(12) (1952); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951);
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12 (1949); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957);
WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-102(G) (Supp. 1957).
114 See Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1176 (1941).
115 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(11 G) (Supp. 1957), "and personal
property not exceeding $6,000 in value"; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23 (Supp.
1957), "the personal property used by them for the purposes for which they are
established"; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), "furniture and personal
property"; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-297 (1958), "furniture and furnishings"; TEx.
Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951), "books and furniture therein";
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(4) (1959), "personal property therein"; VA. CODE
ANN. § 58-12 (1949), "furniture and furnishings therein"; W.VA. Cone ANN.
§ 678(9), "household goods and furniture pertaining thereto."
116 In a few instances, language is used which would support an argument
in favor of exempting personal property used as part of a parsonage. E.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958), "all property owned by religious groups used
only for single family residences. . . ." Conversely, some statutes suggest the
parsonage exemption is limited to realty. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-207 (1947),
"shall be exempt from all taxes on real property"; IOWA CODE § 427.1 (1958),
"grounds and buildings used by . . . religious institutions . . . solely for their
appropriate objects."
1!7Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86, 118 A.2d
809 (1955).
118 Woodstock v. The Retreat, Inc., 125 Conn. 52, 3 A.2d 232 (1938).
TAX EXEMPTION
expressly required by law," 9 and to secure exemption for a parsonage
located on a lot separate and distinct from that on which the church
was situated, despite statutory language expressly limiting exemption to
the church and grounds on which it was built, together with "the
parsonage thereon."'
120
Occasional litigation has, on the other hand, resulted from overly
strict interpretations of the parsonage exemption by taxing officers. In
one case,' 21 the exemption had been administratively denied to a church-
owned minister's residence because there was no house of worship to
which the parsonage was appurtenant, the minister being assigned to
preside over several scattered congregations of deaf members holding
services in meeting houses owned by other churches. In granting ex-
emption under a statute merely requiring that the exempt buildings be
"occupied as a parsonage by the officiating clergymen of any religious
corporation," the court defined a parsonage to be simply a residence
provided by a church for a minister serving its religious uses, and opined
that by "officiating clergyman" was meant "a settled or incumbent
pastor or minister ... installed over . . . [and] serving the needs of a
reasonably localized and established congregation. ' 121 In another decision
from the same jurisdiction, denial of exemption was reversed where the
building in question housed both a chapel used for worship and an
apartment occupied by the minister, for absence of exclusive use as
either a place of worship or a parsonage should not result in denial of
an exemption clearly intended to be allowed both.' 2 3
As in the case of other exemptions, the exact language of the
parsonage exemption statute is often of controlling significance. For
example, a parsonage rented to ordinary tenants clearly should not be
entitled to exemption if the statute requires that it be occupied by the
minister;' 2 but where the statute merely exempts "parsonages" as such,
without any further conditions, such renting out does not necessarily
preclude exemption.1 21 Conversely, a building leased by a church from
its owner for use as a parsonage may be exempt where the statutory
119Trustees of St. Paul Methodist Episcopal Church South v. District of
Columbia, 212 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Accord, Broadway Christian Church v.
Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 448, 66 S.W. 32 (1902).
12OFoley v. Oberlin Congregational Church, 67 Wash. 280, 121 Pac. 65
(1912). Accord, Treasurer of Dauphin County v. St. Stephen's Church, 3 Phila,
189 (Pa. 1858).
121 St. Matthew's Lutheran Church for the Deaf v. Division of Tax Appeals,
18 N.J. Super. 552, 87 A.2d 732 (App. Div. 1952).
12 2 1d. at 558, 87 A.2d at 735.
123Jersey City v. Beth-El Baptist Church, 18 N.J. Misc. 208, 12 A.2d 152
(Bd. Tax App. 1940). Cf. Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233
(1948).
124 See notes 109 and 110 supra.
125 Protestant Episcopal Church v. Priolean, 63 S.C. 70, 40 S.E. 1026 (1902)
State v. Kittle, 87 W.Va. 526, 105 S.E. 775 (1921).
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language does not require ownership by the church,' 26 but taxation would
obtain if the statute contemplated such ownership.' Similarly, although
the statutory language in some jurisdictions clearly indicates an intention
to limit tax relief to only one parsonage per church,' 25 in others the
statutes contemplate that any number of parsonages eligible in other
respects may qualify.
129
A somewhat delicate interpretative problem, in view of the varieties
of internal church organization, arises with respect to whether the
parsonage exemption includes residential facilities provided at church
expense for religious personnel other than the immediately officiating
pastor. In a few jurisdictions the problem is partially disposed of by
express statutory language exempting in addition to parsonages other
buildings such as "episcopal residences,"' 3 0  "convents,"'' "monas-
teries,""' "nunneries,"' 3 3 or "property . . . used for housing . . .
members of religious orders and communities. ... "' In the absence
of applicable language of this type, however, residential facilities pro-
vided for church personnel other than the officiating clergyman have
usually been held to be taxable."'s
In some 19 jurisdictions, there is no express statutory exemption for
parsonages.' 36 In some of these states parsonages nonetheless may
qualify for exemption under other statutes exempting church property,
where the language used is broad enough to cover residential property
occupied 'by the clergy. For example, in states where exemption is un-
126 See Gray v. LaFayette County, 65 Wis. 567, 27 N.W. 311 (1886).
127 See Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.W. 745, 80 N.W. 41 (1899).
128E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(O) (1951), "not more than one such
pastoral residence shall be so exempt for any one church or congregation"; WASH.
REV. CODE § 84.36.020 (Supp. 1957), "a parsonage."
129 See MASS. ANN. L.Aws ch. 59, § 5 (Eleventh) (1953) "each parsonage,"
Boston v. Old South Soc'y, 314 Mass. 364, 50 N.E.2d 51 (1943).
130D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(p) (1951). Cf. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-201 (1949), residence of supervisory minister engaged in "the ministrations
of such church society" throughout a "district or general church area, within the
State of Kansas"; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (Eleventh) (Supp. 1958), residence
of district superintendent of Methodist Church; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.35
(Supp. 1958), residence of district superintendent of church.
'3' N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957).
132 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23(111) (Supp. 1957).
133 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(5) (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(5) (Supp.
1958) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3832 (1959), "convent."
13 4 Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955).
135 Griswold v. Quinn, 97 Kan. 611, 156 Pac. 761 (1916); Worcester Dist.
Stewards v. Assessors of Worcester, 321 Mass. 492, 73 N.E.2d 898 (1947). Cf.
Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86, 118 A.2d 809 (1955),
residence for priests serving as faculty; Sisterhood of Holy Nativity v. Tax
Assessors of Newport, 73 R.I. 445, 57 A.2d 184 (1948), convent.
136 Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.
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conditionally granted all church property generally, church-owned
parsonages would seem to be clearly included. 3
The exact terminology of the exemption law, of course, is the most
significant factor to be considered. Thus, religious "worship" being
demonstrably narrower than religious "purposes,"' 38  ministerial resi-
dences have usually been denied exemption where exclusive use for
religious "worship" is the test,"' but have often obtained relief,
modernly, at least, under a requirement of exclusive use for religious
"purposes."' 4 ° Cases construing the latter type legislation, however,
have frequently relied heavily upon a factual determination that the
living quarters in question were necessary and purely incidental to a
primary religious purpose, and hence were provided for reasons "of
institutional necessity as contrasted with mere considerations of resi-
dential convenience."' 4' This approach to the problem regards ordinary
residential use as a parsonage as an insufficient basis for exemption.
137 See Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. St. Stanislaus Kostka Church,
49 Del. 5, 108 A.2d 581 (1954) ; Petition of Board of Foreign Missions, 221 Minn.
536, 22 N.W.2d 642 (1946). But see Church of Holy Faith v. State Tax Comm'r.,
39 N.M. 403, 48 P.2d 777 (1935) residential house and lot rented, where proceeds
used for religious purposes, held not exempt as "church property."
'38 See Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 755, 221 P.2d 59
(1950); People v. Logan Square Presbyterian Church, 249 Ill. 9, 94 N.E. 155
(1911); Trustees of Griswold College v. State of Iowa, 46 Iowa 706 (1877).
139 St. Mark's Church v. City of Brunswick, 78 Ga. 541, 3 S.E. 561 (1887);
Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3 (1871) ; Society of
Precious Blood v. Board of Tax Appeals, 149 Ohio St. 62, 77 N.E.2d 459 (1948) ;
Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. San Antonio, 201 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918). See William T. Stead Memorial Center v. Wareham, 299 Mass. 235,
12 N.E.2d 725 (1938).
140 Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 755, 221 P.2d 59
(1950); East Orange v. Church of Our Lady, 25 N.J. Misc. 58, 50 A.2d 390
(Div. Tax App. 1946); Syracuse Center of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Syracuse, 163
Misc. 535, 297 N.Y.Supp. 587 (Sup.Ct. 1937); Silver Bay Ass'n. v. Braisted,
80 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. T. 1920). Accord, Trustees of Griswold College v. State
of Iowa, 46 Iowa 706 (1877), exemption of "buildings of . . . religious institutions
... devoted solely to appropriate objects of these institutions"; Bishop's Residence
Co. of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hudson, 91 Mo. 671, 4 S.W. 435 (1887),
parsonage exempt as property used for "charitable" purposes. Contra, People
ex rel Thompson v. First Congregational Church of Oak Park, 232 Ill. 158, 83
N.E. 536 (1907) ; Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 214 (1872).
141 Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 755, 759, 221 P.2d 59,
62 (1950) exempting living quarters of priests and maintenance personnel at a
religious retreat. Accord, People ex rel Society of Free Church of St. Mary The
Virgin v. Feitner, 168 N.Y. 494, 497, 61 N.E. 762, 763 (1901), holding that living
quarters in church building for a heating engineer and for curates who conducted
religious exercises, counseled and advised members and assisted generally, were
exempt as property used exclusively for religious purposes where such quarters
were factually "necessary and incidental to the work carried on" in the building;
In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949),
holding church exempt despite incidental use of part of building for caretaker's
living quarters, under statute requiring exclusive use for worship.
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Whether other institutional purposes served by or in conjunction with
such residential use sufficiently bring the structure within the require-
ments for exemption depends upon judicial evaluation whether the
religious aspects appear to be dominant or incidental.'42
CHURCH CEMETERIES
Tax exemption of cemetery grounds prevails in every jurisdiction;
but as with other exemptions, the statutory conditions incorporate sub-
stantive differences reflecting diversities of local policy. Although owner-
ship and operation of burial grounds historically has been and in many
communities still is, regarded as a traditional and appropriate activity of
churches or church-affiliated associations, it is significant that, with but
one exception (Connecticut),"' the exemption statutes uniformly make
no mention of, and impose no condition to exemptability in terms of,
religious ownership or affiliation.
In nearly every statute, the exempted property is described nomina-
tively as "cemeteries,""' "graveyards,"' 4 5  "burying grounds,"' 46 or
some variant of these words. 141 Seven jurisdictions impose no conditions
to exemption except such as are implicit in the particular descriptive
appellation employed.' 48 Eleven states insist that the property be actually
or exclusively "used" or "held" as a burial ground; 149 fifteen attach a
condition that the cemetery be not operated or held for profit;... and
142 See People ex rel Carson v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 239, 137 N.E. 863, 865
(1922), holding convent not exempt as property used exclusively for religious
purposes since "The nuns have no relation, near or remote, to the public, but are
completely separated and secluded from the world, and are not in any manner
connected with public worship, religious instruction, or public religious ob-
servances"; Haven of Grace v. Township of Lakewood, 19 N.J. Misc. 414, 416,
20 A.2d 518, 519 (Bd. Tax App. 1941), denying exemption to combination resi-
dence, church office headquarters and rest home. "The religious aspects of the
use of this property seem to us to have been merely incidental, not primary."
143 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(11) (1958).
144E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(14) (Supp. 1957).
145 E.g., ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(7) (1956).
146E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.14 (1953).
147 E.g., Ky. CONST. § 170, "places of burial"; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A,
§ 10(II G) (Supp. 1957), "tombs and rights of burial"; ORE. REv. STAT. § 307.150
(1957), "burial grounds, tombs and rights of burial"; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 44-3-3 (11) (1956), "lots of land used exclusively for burial grounds".
14$ ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 91-A,
§ 10(G) (Supp. 1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(5) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 59, § 5 (Twelfth) (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.150 (1957); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-502(3) (1955); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958).
149 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(11) (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958); IOWA CODE § 427.1(7) (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-201 (Second) (1949); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 211.7 (Sixth) (1948); MIs.
CODE ANN. § 9697(a) (Supp. 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.9 (Supp. 1958);
N.D. REV. CODE § 57-0208(5) (1943); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3(11) (1956) ;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5317 (1959) ; Wis. STAT. § 70.11(13) (1955).
L50 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3 (9) (Supp. 1957); DEL. CODE ANN.
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eight impose both a "use" or "holding" and a nonprofit condition to
exemption.' 5' Three jurisdictions limit the exemption to "public" ceme-
teries,'52 while in five others the cemetery exemption provisions are sui
generis.5 3 Although the cemetery exemption statutes of only eight states
explicitly exempt funds held for maintenance and care of cemeteries,
1 54
such endowment funds are often exempt under other provisions ex-
empting intangibles.' 55
It appears to be settled that the property exempted as a "cemetery"
or "place of burial" is not restricted to tenanted graves, but embraces
paths, landscaping, ornamental plantings, and reasonable areas reserved
for future interments. 5 6
The words are to be interpreted according to the known
habits and usages of the people, which are to congregate their
dead in places set apart for that sacred purpose, encircled by
holy influences and subject to regulations for preserving the
decency, peace, and sanctity of all their surroundings.15r
In general, to be eligible for the cemetery exemption, the land in
question must be dedicated or set apart for burial purposes in some
appropriate manner, and either be or have been used as such or active
measures taken to prepare it for such use.' 58 Statutory variations, how-
ever, play a significant role. Where exclusive "use" for cemetery pur-
tit. 9, § 8105 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06 (1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201
(Supp. 1958); IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Eighth) (1951); KY. CONST. § 170; L.6.
CONST. art. X, § 4; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.100(4) (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 84-202 (1947); N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(2)
(1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(b) (1950) ; S.C. CODE § 65-1522(14)
(1952); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(3) (1949).
151 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(7) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84.206
(Third) (Supp. 1957); CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1b; D.C. CODE § 47-801a(1)
(1951) ; NEB. REV. STAT § 77-202 (1943) ; N.Y. TAx LAW § 4(6a) (Supp. 1958);
OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.14 (1953); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(3) (1951).
152 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(14) (Supp. 1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 272.02
(Supp. 1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:22 (1955).
153 OKLA. STAT. tit. 8, § 7 (1951), all property of cemetery corporations
properly platted and dedicated; NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.130 (1957), "cemeteries
and graveyards set apart and used for and open to the public for the burial of
the dead, when no charge is made for burial therein"; S.D. CODE § 11.1911 (1939),
exempts all property of duly organized cemetery corporations; WASH. REV. COoE
§ 68.20.110 (1958), semble; Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 38.103 (1945), private
cemeteries platted and dedicated in accordance with statutory requirements.
154 California, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Virginia and Wisconsin. For citations, see notes 147-151, supra.
155 See notes 88, 89, 102-104, supra.
156TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 194
(1948) ; Annot., 168 A.L.R. 283 (1947).
157Metairie Cemetery Ass'n v. Board of Assessors, 37 La. Ann. 32, 35
(1885).
'58Mulroy v. Churchman, 60 Iowa 717, 719, 15 N.W. 583, 584 (1883),
"Surely the setting apart of half an acre in the corner of a 40-acre tract, as a
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poses is the expressed condition, exemption has been allowed only to
those portions of a cemetery tract actually platted, maintained and em-
ployed for burial purposes, 159 or for purposes incidental and necessary
thereto. 6 ' Actual interments, either present 18' or past, 1 62 appear to be
necessary rather than a mere intention to use the land for burials in the
future.1 3 On the other hand, where exemption is granted to property
"set apart," "held" or "reserved" for cemetery purposes, present non-
use for interments does not defeat eligibility.64 provided the "holding"
for future cemetery use is adequately evidenced by conduct consistent
with bona fide intent not to abandon or divert to non-cemetery pur-
poses.' 65 A similar result obtains where exemption is conferred un-
place for the burial of the dead, cannot exempt the whole 40 from taxation."
See also, State v. Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 20 N.W.2d 673 (1945) ; C. A. Wagner
Construction Co. v. Sioux Falls, 71 S.D. 587, 27 N.W.2d 916 (1947).
159 Burbridge v. Smyrna Baptist Church, 212 Ark. 924, 209 S.W.2d 685
(1948); Glen Oak Cemetery Co. v. Court of Appeals, 358 Ill. 48, 192 N.E. 673
(1934) ; Mount Hope Cemetery Co. v. Pleasant, 139 Kan. 417, 32 P.2d 500 (1934) ;
Evans v. City of Jackson, 201 Miss. 14, 28 So. 2d 249 (1946). But cf. Petition of
Gundry, 333 Mich. 700, 53 N.W.2d 586 (1952).
160 People v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 371 Ill. 510, 21 N.E.2d 766 (1939).
161 See Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. San Francisco, 81 Cal. App. 2d 371,
184 P.2d 160 (1947), denying exemption to cemetery land, under "exclusive use"
requirement, where all interred bodies had been exhumed and removed to another
location preparatory to sale of cemetery land for subdivision purposes.
162Ponder v. Richardson, 213 Ark. 238, 240, 210 S.W.2d 316, 317 (1948),
"The fact that no bodies have been buried in the cemetery in recent years does
not militate against its existence as a public burying ground." Accord: Roman
Catholic Episcopal Corp. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 24 Ont. L. R. 35 (1911).
163 State v. Ritschel, supra note 158.
164 Pomona Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles County, 49 Cal. App. 2d 626, 122
P.2d 327 (1942) ; Evergreen Memorial Park Ass'n v. Evatt, 141 Ohio St. 1, 46
N.E.2d 286 (1943) ; People ex rel Woodlawn Cemetery v. Chambers, 91 N.Y.S.2d
774 (App. T., 1949); People ex rel Oak Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. Pratt, 129 N.Y.
68, 29 N.E. 7 (1891); Raleigh Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Raleigh, 235 N.C. 509,
70 S.E.2d 506 (1952).
165 Memorial Hills Ass'n v. Sequoia Inv. Corp., 157 Cal. App. 2d 119, 124,
320 P.2d 567, 570 (1958), exemption denied since "the 'holding' must be active,
factual and real, not merely passive, as in the instant case"; Petition of Auditor
General, 294 Mich. 221, 292 N.W. 709 (1940), casual use of vacant cemetery land
for vegetable gardening by indigents held not to destroy exemption since "not to
be regarded as an abandonment" of cemetery objectives; National Cemetery Ass'n
v. Benson, 344 Mo. 784, 129 S.W.2d 842 (1939), exemption denied to "wild and
vacant" unplatted 65 acre tract of cemetery property; Laureldale Cemetery Ass'n
v. Matthews, 55 Pa. D. & C. 189 (1945), rev'd on other grounds, 354 Pa. 239,
47 A.2d 277 (1946), exemption allowed where undeveloped portion of cemetery
constituted reasonable provision for future needs; C. A. Wagner Constr. Co. v.
Sioux Falls, 71 S.D. 587, 27 N.W.2d 916 (1947), exemption denied where land was
never platted as cemetery lots, never used for burials, and use as a cemetery was
forbidden by ordinance. To some effect under statutes exempting land "used or
intended to be used" for burial grounds, see Saddle River Township v. Slavonian
Catholic Church of the Assumption, 20 N.J. Misc. 92, 24 A.2d 398 (Bd. Tax App.
1942); Green Mountain Cemetery Co.'s Appeal, 7 Pa. D. & C. 200 (1925).
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conditionally upcn "cemeteries"' or "burying grounds.' 1 67
As with other exemption provisions, statutes relating to cemeteries
are often quite non-specific as to the scope of the exemption. Less than
a score of states, for example, explicitly designate tombs, mausoleums,
monuments, vaults, crypts, or like structures as exempt,' 68 and only a
few include crematoriums."' Moreover, only rarely does the exempting
language expressly cover personal property used in connection with a
cemetery. 17  It is probable that structural additions to cemetery land
normally if not invariably escape taxation along with the land. In
allowing exemption to mausoleums under a statute exempting only
"lands used exclusively as graveyards," the Kansas court observed that
mausoleums have come into common use as places of burial for the
dead, and that crypts therein are ordinarily disposed of in a manner
similar to gravesites. Being places of burial, the court concluded,
17 1
Every reason that can be urged in favor of exempting
graveyards from taxation can likewise be urged in favor of
exempting mausoleums.
The few cases treating the question of the tax status of tangible
personal property used in connection with cemeteries, however, have
generally denied exemption where the statutory language speaks only
in terms of realty.'1 2 Funds derived from cemetery operations and held
in trust for future care and maintenance of cemetery property, however,
have frequently been treated as part of the realty and hence exempt173
166 Mountain View Cemetery Co. v. Massey, 109 W. Va. 473, 155 S.E. 547
(1930).
167 State v. Crystal Lake Cemetery Ass'n, 155 Minn. 187, 193 N.W. 170
(1923).
108 District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont
and Wisconsin. For citations, see notes 147-151, supra.
169 See IOWA CODE, § 427.1(3) (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.150 (1957).
170 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(11) (1958), "tangible property"; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Eighth) (1951), "real and personal property"; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(7) (1959), "lands ... trust funds and other property"; W.VA.
CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958), "all property, real and personal"; WIs. STAT.
§ 70.11(13) (1955), "personal property necessary for the care and management
of burial grounds."
171 Gray v. Craig, 103 Kan. 100, 101, 172 Pac. 1004 (1918). Accord:
Washelli Cemetery Ass'n v. King County, 158 Wash. 599, 292 Pac. 101 (1930).
Cf. Forest Hill Cemetery Co. v. Creath, 127 Tenn. 686, 157 S.W. 412 (1913).
172 Milford v. Worcester, 213 Mass. 162, 100 N.E. 60 (1912) ; State ex rel.
Mt. Mora Cemetery Ass'n v. Casey, 210 Mo. 235, 109 S.W. 1 (1908); Rosedale
Cemetery Ass'n v. Linden Township, 73 N.J.L. 421, 63 Atl. 904 (Sup.Ct. 1906);
Forest Hill Cemetery Co. v. Creath, 127 Tenn. 686, 157 S.W. 412 (1913) ; Holly-
wood Cemetery Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 106, 96 S.E. 207 (1918). Contra,
Pomona Cemetery Ass'n v. Los Angeles County, 49 Cal. App. 2d 626, 122 P.2d 327
(1942).
173 Greenbush Cemetery Ass'n v. Van Natta, 49 Ind. App. 192, 94 N.E. 899
(1911) ; Collector of Taxes v. Oldfield, 219 Mass. 374, 106 N.E. 1014 (1914);
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in the absence of statutory language precluding this result.174
A subsidiary problem to be kept in mind in connection with church
cemeteries relates to the nonprofit requirements often imposed by legis-
latures.' 75 Depending to some extent upon the manner in which they
are verbally formulated, such conditions may constitute a threat to
exemption even of church owned and operated burial grounds. It seems
likely that such requirements are chiefly aimed at precluding tax favors
for commercially owned cemetery lots which are held for the purpose
of sale at a price which will return a profit on the owner's invest-
ment.' 76 However, typical statutory language---"not used or held for
private or corporate profit" ;177 not "held by way of investment" ;178
"not owned or held . .. for speculative purposes" ;179 not held "with a
view to profit, or for the purpose of speculating in the sale thereof"'o -
is broad enough to support denial of exemption of church owned ceme-
tery lands.' 8' In one Pennsylvania case, for example, cemetery land
acquired and operated by a church as a means of producing funds for
general church use was held not exempt on this ground even though the
actual receipts were far less than operating expenses.' 8 ' In addition,
exemption has also been denied to nonprofit cemeteries where some of
the lots were held by private persons for speculative purposes with un-
Forest Hill Cemetery Co. v. Creath, 127 Tenn. 686, 157 S.W. 412 (1913).
174 See Commonwealth v. Lexington Cemetery Co., 114 Ky. 165, 70 S.W. 280
(1902); Hollywood Cemetery Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 106, 96 S.E. 207
(1918).
175 See note 149, supra. Even in the absence of such a requirement in the
statute, a nonprofit condition may be judicially imposed. See Sunset Memorial
Gardens v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 327 P.2d 766 (Idaho 1958) ; City of Clifton v.
State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 133 N.J.L. 379, 44 A.2d 102 (Ct. E. & App. 1945).
Contra, Mountain View Cemetery Co. v. Massey, 109 W. Va. 473, 155 S.E. 547
(1930).
176 Some of the statutes are expressly to this effect. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 64-201 (Eighth) (1951); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(5) (1957); OHio REv.
CODE § 5709.14 (1953); TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(3) (1951).
177 See MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 84-202 (1947); N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
•178 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8105 (1953).
179 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 192.06 (1957).
180 See OHIO REv. CODE § 5709.14 (1953) ; S.C. CODE § 65-1522(14) (1952).
181 Although the majority view appears to permit exemption where the net
earnings from cemetery operations are exclusively devoted to cemetery purposes
and not diverted to private channels, see San Gabriel Cemetery Ass'n v. Los
Angeles County, 49 Cal. App. 2d 624, 122 P.2d 330 (1942); State ex rel. Cunning-
ham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So. 872 (1899); Ewing Cemetery
Ass'n v. Ewing Township, 126 NJ.L. 610, 20 A.2d 607 (Sup.Ct 1941), some courts
have treated the receipt of net gain over and above costs as precluding exemption
even where it was not shown that private persons would share in such "profits."
See Simcoke v. Sayre, 148 Iowa 132, 126 N.W. 816 (1910) ; Brown's Heirs v.
Pittsburgh, I Pa. Sup. Ct. Cas. 8, 16 At. 43 (1888). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ever-
green Burial Park 176 Va. 9, 10 S.E.2d 495 (1940).
182 Brown v. Pittsburgh, supra n. 180.
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restricted rights of transfer.'8 3 In one state, moreover, a condition of
exemption is that "no charge" be made for burial' 4-- a requirement
which many church operated burial grounds presumably could not satisfy
and remain in operation.
Another requirement which may create difficulty for churches
seeking exemption of their cemeteries relates to statutory language al-
lowing exemption only if title to the cemetery is vested in specified types
of entities, such as cemetery associations or corporations. Conditions of
this type are found in the laws of at least five states,"8 5 and have been
invoked to deny exemption to otherwise fully eligible cemetery prop-
erty."8 6 The extent to which such requirements are obstacles, of course,
will depend upon the terms of state law as well as internal organizational
policies of the church.
It appears that church owned and operated cemeteries may clearly
obtain exemption by conforming to the statutory requirements in every
state except Idaho. In this jurisdiction, as in Minnesota and New
Hampshire, exemption is granted only to "public" cemeteries.18 7 A re-
cent decision of the Idaho Supreme Court casts serious doubt on the
availability of exemption under such language to any privately owned
burial grounds.' 8 Although the case involved a cemetery corporation
organized for profit and the court emphasized the private profit motive as
precluding eligibility as a "public" cemetery, the opinion contains strong
and deliberate language supporting as an alternative basis for decision
that the word "public" contemplated ownership by a governmental or
quasi-governmental entity. Moreover, since it appears to have been con-
ceded that the cemetery in question was open for use by all members of
the public on equal terms, the decision in favor of taxation squarely
rejects general and nonexclusive availability as meeting the legislative
183 Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n v. Evatt, 145 Ohio St. 194, 61 N.E.2d 207
(1945); Crown Hill Cemetery Ass'n v. Evatt, 143 Ohio St. 399, 55 N.E.2d 660
(1944).
18 4 NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.130 (1957).
185 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Eighth), nonprofit Indiana cemetery
corporation; IOWA CODE § 427.1(7) (1958), cemetery associations or societies;
N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6a) (Supp. 1958), corporation or association; OKLA. STAT.
tit. 8, § 7 (1951), cemetery corporations; S.D. CODE § 11.911 (1939), cemetery
corporations; WIs. STAT. § 70.11(13) (1955), cemetery associations. In some
states an alternative and more comprehensive exemption is available to cemeteries
so organized than to noncomplying cemeteries. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 58,
§ 20 (1954), incorporated cemeteries; MIcH. ComP. LAWS § 456.108 (1948), rural
cemetery associations; N.D. REv. CODE § 10-1011 (1943), cemetery corporations.
186 See La Fontaine Lodge v. Eviston, 71 Ind. App. 445, 123 N.E. 468 (1919);
Trinity Church v. New York, 10 How. Pr. 138 (N.Y. 1854). Cf. State v. Town-
ship of Clinton, 49 NJ.L. 370, 8 Atd. 296 (Sup.Ct. 1887).
187 See note 151, supra.
188 Sunset Memorial Gardens v. Idaho State Tax Comm., ___ Idaho ,
327 P.2d 766 (1958).
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intent embraced in the adjective "public.ls 9
In Minnesota, however, the opposite view has been reached, with
the court stating that exemption of "public burying grounds" does not
"depend on the character of the owner, but upon whether the property
is in fact public burying grounds" by reason of its dedication and use
by the public in general. 90 Although no authoritative judicial interpre-
tation of the New Hampshire exemption of "public cemeteries" has
been found, the Supreme Court of that state in an analogous context
has declared, in dictum, that "a cemetery, though maintained by a
private corporation, may fairly be deemed a public burial ground. .. "
if it is open, under reasonable regulations, to the use of the public for
the burial of the dead.'
91
CHURCH-AFFILIATED SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
Tax exemption of parochial schools as well as colleges and other
educational institutions operated by or affiliated with churches is wide-
spread, but only rarely does the statutory language explicitly refer to
the religious connection as a factor in establishing eligibility.-92 In most
jurisdictions, the statutes simply grant exemption to "universities,"
"colleges," "academies," "seminaries," "schools," and "institutions of
learning",193 or, in even broader terms, to property used for school or
189 Cf. NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.130 (1957), exempting all cemeteries, public
or private, which are "set apart and used for and open to the public for the burial
of the dead."
190 State v. Crystal Lake Cemetery Ass'n, 155 Minn. 187, 193 N.V. 170
(1923).
191 Davie v. Rochester Cemetery Ass'n, 91 N.H. 494, 495, 23 A.2d 377, 378
(1941).
192 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(14) (1958), "real property and its equip-
ment owned by, or held in trust for, any religious organization and exclusively
used as a school"; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939), exemption of property of
"charitable society" as defined to include organization owning or occupying a
building "as part of the .. .educational program of any church"; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958), "property . . . owned by any church . . . and used or
operated exclusively for . . . educational . . . purposes"; WYo. CONST. art. XV,
§ 12, "church schools." Cf. S.C. CODE § 65-1523(26) (1952), special exemption
granted to Columbia Bible College. A provision formerly in WASH. REv. CoDE
§ 84.36.050 (1955) limiting the exemption for church affiliated colleges to only one
college per religious denomination was repealed by WASH. STAT. 1955, ch. 196, § 7.
193 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958), "schools"; ARIM. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 42-271(3) (1956), "colleges, schoolhouses"; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103
(1953), "college or school"; D.C. CODE § 47-801a(j) (1951), "schools, colleges, or
universities"; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958), "college, . .. incorporated
academy or other seminary of learning"; LA. CONST. art. X, § 4, "schools and
colleges"; NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.105 (1957), "nonprofit private schools"; N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23 (IV), "schools, seminaries of learning, colleges, academies
and universities"; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), "colleges, schools,
academies or seminaries"; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958), "colleges,
seminaries, academies and free schools."
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educational purposes.1 9 4  Other forms of expression are occasionally
found. 95 Statutes of this type are consistently held to be a source of
exemption for parochial schools"9 6 and church-affiliated institutions of
higher education,' in the absence of other disqualifying factors. The
institution in question, however, must constitute a bona fide educational
entity offering as part of its regular curriculum a substantial portion of
the educational training which would normally be pursued by a student
enrolled at a comparative educational level in the public educational
system.
1 9 8
In a minority of states, the tax exemption statutes are neither clear
nor specific as to exemptability of church educational property. In some,
for example, no mention is made of educational property in the exemp-
tion law;'9 . and in some of these jurisdictions other language, such as
19 4 E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(13) (Supp. 1957), "used exclusively ...
for school or educational purposes"; IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Fifth) (1951),
"used and set apart for educational . . . purposes"; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 84-202 (1947), "used exclusively for . . . educational purposes"; N.M. CONST.
art. VIII, § 3, "used for educational purposes."
195 E.g., CAL. REV & TA-, CODE § 203, "educational institution of collegiate
grade"; KT. CONST. § 170, "institutions of education"; MD. ANN. CODa art. 81,
§ 9(8) (1957), "educational or literary institutions"; MIcH. COMp. LAws § 211.7,
as amended by PuB. AcTs 1958, AcT 190, p. 219, "educational . . . institutions";
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9697 (Supp. 1958), "college or institution for the education of
youths"; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 15.2(3) (Supp. 1957), "scientific or educational
institution, college or society"; S.D. CODE § 57.0311 (1939), "educational in-
stitution".
196 Phillips County v. Sister Estelle, 42 Ark. 536 (1884) ; City of Wilmington
v. Wilmington Monthly Meeting of Friends, 33 Del. (3 W.W. Harr.) 180, 133
At. 88 (1926) ; People ex rel. Pearshall v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 311 11. 11,
142 N.E. 520 (1924); Commonwealth v. Board of Educ., 166 Ky. 610, 179 S.W. 596
(1915) ; Nebraska Conference Ass'n v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588, 90 N.W.2d
50 (1958) ; Hennepin County v. Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N.W. 761 (1881). The
statutory word "schoolhouse", however, has been held to connote only publicly
owned school buildings. See Indianapolis v. McLean, 8 Ind. 328 (1856).
107 People ex rel. Thompson v. St. Francis Xavier Female Academy, 233 I1.
26, 84 N.E. 55 (1908); City of Louisville v. Southern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary, 100 Ky. 506, 36 S.W. 995 (1896) ; Sisters of Mercy v. Town of Hookset,
93 N.H. 301, 42 A.2d 222 (1945). Cf. District of Columbia v. Mt. Vernon
Seminary, 100 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
198 See State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 249 Minn. 552, 83 NAV.2d
242 (1957).
199 See MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 59, § 5 (Third), "literary, benevolent, charita-
ble and scientific institutions"; UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953), "charitable pur-
poses." The California constitutional authorization for the "welfare exemption,"
CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1c, uses only the adjectives "religious, hospital or chari-
table purposes," but has been held to authorize statutory exemption of parochial
schools. Lundberg v. Alameda County, 46 Cal.2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956), app.
dismissed sub. nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956). In Maine,
express statutory provisions authorize a rebate of taxes paid by colleges, ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A (II H) (Supp. 1957); but there is no provision for
exemption except as it may be included in exemption granted "benevolent and
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an exemption of property used for "charitable" purposes, has been
pressed into service as an effective substitute.2"' In still other statutes,
the educational property granted exemption is described in such phrases
as "public colleges," 201 "public schools"20 2 and "public institutions of
learning. 21 3 The courts are divided as to the meaning of this kind of
language, some holding that the legislative policy embodied in the
adjective "public" is satisfied by a private school open to all members of
the public, 4 while others maintain that it excludes from exemption all
educational institutions not owned and operated by a public entity or
unit of government.20 ' The latter view, however, is compensated for
in some states by availability of exemption to privately owned edu-
cational property under other statutory language.200 In some states, it is
doubtful whether church-affiliated schools and colleges are tax exempt
at all. 207
The specific conditions precedent to exemption of church schools
vary considerably from state to state. 'Requirements are prevalent that
the property be "used" for school or educational purposes 08 and not for
charitable institutions." See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(II A) (Supp.
1957).
200 See Lundberg v. Alameda County, supra note 198; Assessors of Dover v.
Dominican Fathers, 334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225 (1956) ; Goeser v. Voris,
41 Pa. Co. Ct. 504 (1913).
201 See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(1) (1951), "public colleges,
public academies." Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958), "colleges . . .
academies or other seminaries of learning as are open to the general public."
202 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84.206 (First) (Supp. 1957), "public schoolhouses";
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (First), "public schoolhouses"; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 272.02(2) (Supp. 1958), "public schoolhouses."
203 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(1) (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1958), "public
educational purposes"; OHIO REv. CODE § 5709.07 (1953), "public institutions of
learning."
204 See Brunswick School v. Greenwich, 88 Conn. 241, 90 At. 801 (1914)
Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 9 Atl. 907 (1886).
200People ex tel. Pavey v. Ryan, 138 Ill. 263, 27 N.E. 1095 (1891); Hender-
son v. McCuIlogh, 89 Ky. 448, 12 S.W. 932 (1890) ; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St.
229 (1874) ; In re Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N.W. 761 (1881) ; St. Joseph's Church
v. Assessors of Taxes of Providence, 12 R.I. 19 (1878).
200 See In re Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N.W. 761 (1881), exempt as "institution
of purely public charity"; Cleveland Bible College v. Board of Tax Appeals,
151 Ohio St. 258, 85 N.E.2d 284 (1949); exempt as property "used exclusively for
charitable purposes"; Episcopal Academy v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 565, 25 At. 55
(1892), exempt as "purely public charity." In Ohio, the courts have insisted that
the school or college be open to all members of the public in order to qualify for
the charitable exemption. See American Committee of Rabbinical College of Telshe
v. Board of Tax Appeals, 148 Ohio St. 654, 76 N.E.2d 719 (1947) ; Bloch v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 144 Ohio St. 414, 59 N.E.2d 145 (1945) ; The Ursuline Academy
of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 141 Ohio St. 563, 49 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
Accord, Thiel College v. Mercer County, 101 Pa. 530 (1882).2 07 E.g., Maine and Utah. See note 198, suPra.
208 See note 193, supra.
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profit.2 0 9 Some statutes establish additional requirements in the interest
of ensuring conformity to secular educational policy. Colorado, for ex-
ample, grants exemption only to nonprofit private schools "requiring
daily attendance, having a curriculum comparable to ... [public schools
of the same grade level] and having an enrollment of at least forty
students and charging a tuition fee."210  By way of contrast, West
Virginia's school exemption is given only to "free schools." 211  In the
District of Columbia, a somewhat indefinite provision demands that
parochial schools, to be exempt, must "embrace the generally recognized
relationship of teacher and student" ;212 while Wisconsin limits its ex-
emption to schools "offering regular courses 6 months in the year."
213
Express limitations on the maximum area of land exempted in
connection with parochial schools are occasionally stipulated by the legis-
lature, 2 14 ranging from one acre in Rhode Island215 to 640 acres in
Mississippi; 216 but in the absence of such provisions, the jud'cially im-
plied inclusion of adjacent land reasonably necessary to convenient use
and occupation prevails nearly everywhere. 217 In view of the extensive
land areas often needed to carry out educational and recreational activi-
ties sponsored by modern schools, the case law generally indicates a
judicial willingness to approve exemption of substantially larger physical
acreage for schools than for other exempt uses.21 ' Thus, playgrounds219
and other recreational areas, 22 in actual use in conjunction with paro-chial schools and seminaries are commonly accorded exemption. In con-
200E.g., a nonprofit requirement is included in the exemption laws cited
supra, notes 192-94, of Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Dakota.
210 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3(7) (Supp. 1957).
2 1 1 W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(9) (Supp. 1958).
212 D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-801a(j) (1951).
213 WIS. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955).
214 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-201 (Fifth) (1951), 50 acres; IOWA C.OD
§ 427.1(11) (1958), 160 acres in any one township; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,
§ 9(8), 100 acres; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9697 (Supp. 1958), 640 acres; N.J. STAI.
ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), 5 acres; R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 44-3-3(5) (1956),
1 acre; WASH. Rav. CODE § 84.36.050 (Supp. 1957), 100 acres.
2 15 R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-3-3 (5) (1956).
216 MIss. CODE ANN. § 9697 (Supp. 1958).
217 See Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1176 (1941).
218 See Horton v. Fountain Valley School, 98 Colo. 480, 56 P.2d 933 (1936);
Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers, 334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225 (1956).
210 Rettew v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church, 4 Penn. 593, 58 Atd. 828
(Del. 1902) ; In re Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N.W. 761 (1881).
220Horton v. Fountain Valley School, 98 Colo. 480, 56 P.2d 933 (1936);
People ex rel. Pearshall v. Catholic Bishop, 311 Il. 11, 142 N.E. 520 (1924);
Monticello Female Seminary v. People, 106 Ill. 398 (1883) ; Assessors of Dover v.
Dominican Fathers, 334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225 (1956) ; People ex reL Mission-
ary Sisters v. Reilly, 85 App.Div. 71, 83 N.Y.Supp. 39 (1903). Unimproved areas
not presently in use, but only intended for future development for recreational
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nection with colleges located in crowded metropolitan centers, parking
lots used by faculty members and employees are quite appropriately ex-
empt as grounds reasonably necessary to accomplishment of the college's
educational purposes."'
Although the courts generally appear to be willing to tolerate
somewhat atypical collateral activities of private educational institutions
as not destructive of an exemption based on "use," '222 a notable division
of opinion exists with respect to exemption of faculty residential facilities
provided -by the school or college. In a few states faculty housing owned
by the school is expressly exempted by statute. 2  Where there is no
express exempting language, the split of authorities can be attributed in
large part to differences in the language of statutes relied upon to exempt
such housing along with the school or college proper. Homes of faculty
and administrative personnel may be held eligible with greater conviction
and ease of justification where the statute grants exemption to "grounds
annexed" to an educational institution and "necessary" to its occupancy
and enjoyment, 221 or where it simply exempts all "buildings used as a
college, "225 than under a statute which requires property for which
exemption is claimed to be "used exclusively" for exempt purposes.220
The subtle distinctions which occasionally prevail in these matters are
illustrated by two recent cases in one of which faculty residences were
purposes of school, are not exempt. People ex rel. Pearshall v. Catholic Bishop,
supra, Ramsey County v. Macalester College, 51 Minn. 437, 53 N.W. 704 (1892).
221 Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496,
314 P.2d 209 (1957) ; District of Columbia v. George Washington Univ., 221 F.2d
87 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Webb Academy v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523,
177 N.W. 290 (1920).
222 See Nebraska Conference Ass'n v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588, 90
N.W.2d 50 (1958), farmland operated as part of agricultural and vocational
church school to supply school with produce; Monticello Female Seminary v.
People, 106 I11. 898 (1883) ; Application of New York Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 279 App.Div. 845, 109 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 706, 107
N.E.2d 654 (1952). Cf. Kemp. v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41, 27 P.2d 1036 (1933).
223E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(4) (1958); N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6)(K);
WIs. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955).
224 See Meadville v. Alleghany College, 131 Pa. Super. 343, 200 At. 105
(1938) ; Ursinus College v. Collegeville, 17 Montg. Co. Rep. 61 (Pa. 1901).
225 Elder v. Trustees of Atlanta Univ., 194 Ga. 716, 22 S.E.2d 515 (1942)
Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals, 136 N.J.L. 328, 55 A.2d 290 (Ct. E. & App.
1947) ; Piscatoway Township v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 131 N.J.L. 158, 35 A.2d
711 (Ct. E. & App. 1944). Cf. Troy Conference Academy v. Poultney, 115 Vt.
480, 66 A.2d 2 (1949).
226 See New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. Town of New Canaan, 138
Conn. 347, 84 A.2d 691 (1952); Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91 N.E.2d 497 (1950) ; Smith v. Feather, 229 SAV.2d
417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). Cf. Williams College v. Williamstown Assessors,
167 Mass. 505, 46 N.E. 394 (1897). Contra, Bishop v. County Treasurer, 29 Colo.
143, 68 Pac. 272 (1901); Webb Academy v. Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523, 177
N.W. 290 (1920); State ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston, 214 Mo. 656, 113 S.W. 1083
(1908).
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held not exempt since not "used exclusively for educational purposes,"227
while in the other such residences were exempt as property "used ex-
clusively for schools and colleges.""2 ' Yet, even where exclusive use
for educational purposes is required, exemption of faculty housing is
sometimes allowed where a showing is made that such residential facili-
ties are institutionally necessary and desirable to promote overall edu-
cational objectives.' 29 Probably this doctrinal explanation is simply an
indirect way in which judicial recognition may be given to the practical
need for low-cost faculty housing as an inducement to attract qualified
teachers at subnormal salary scales.
23 0
Student housing or dormitory facilities maintained by an exempt
educational institution are sometimes expressly included within the terms
of the exemption, 231 but are usually held to be exempt even where the
statute is not explicit.232  Especially at the level of higher education,
on-campus housing for students is today an integral element in the
normal educational program, as it was historically. As one court con-
cluded after a thorough historical survey, the settled meaning of
"college" is cca building or group of buildings in which scholars are
housed, fed, instructed and governed under college discipline, while
qualifying for their university degree. 2 33
As with other exemptions, the school and college exemption pro-
visions are often inexplicit as to scope. Some statutes contain a fairly
detailed list of exempt facilities, such as the New Hampshire law 23 4
227 New Canaan Country School, Inc. v. New Canaan, 138 Conn. 347, 84
A.2d 691 (1952).
228 Midwest Bible & Missionary Institute v. Sestric, 364 Mo. 167, 260 S.W.
2d 25 (1953). Accord, Rettew v. St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church, 4 Penn.
593, 58 Atl. 828 (Del. 1902).
2-" See Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496,
314 P.2d 209 (1957); Pratt Institute v. Boyland, 174 N.Y.S. 2d 112 (App. T.
1958) ; Application of Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial College, 191 Misc. 621, 77
N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup.Ct. 1948), aff'd mem., 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1948);
City of Nashville v. Ward-Belmont School, 7 Tenn. App. 610 (1928); Cassiano v.
Ursuline Academy, 64 Tex. 673 (1885).
230 See Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496,
506, 314 P.2d 209, 215 (1957), indicating it is appropriate in such cases to con-
sider "the problem of the non-availability of personnel if these living facilities
were not made available. In the instant case evidence was presented that in the
competitive market for good faculty it would be difficult for the appellant to
obtain competent faculty members without the provision of such facilities. .... "
231 See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-208 (1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 72:23(IV) (Supp. 1957); N.D. REV. CODE § 57-0208(6) (1943); W.VA. CODE
ANN. § 678(a) (Supp. 1958).
232 Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496, 314
P.2d 209 (1957) ; City of Chicago v. University of Chicago, 228 Ill. 605, 81 N.E.
1138 (1907) ; In re Syracuse Univ., 214 App. Div. 375, 212 N.Y.Supp. 253 (1925).
233 Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 327, 42 At]. 87, 91
(1899).
234 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23 (IV) (Supp. 1957).
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which explicitly defines the exemption as "including but not limited to"
dormitories, dining rooms, kitchens, auditoriums, classrooms, infirmaries,
administrative and utility rooms, athletic fields, gymnasiums, boat houses
and wharves. No other statutes contain such a complete catalogue, al-
though several, in addition to buildings and land, enumerate such
property as furniture, libraries, apparatus and equipment.2 35 Many
states exempt generally all parochial school property, both real and
personal.288 Only a small minority of the states appear to deny exemp-
tion to any form of personal property.
2 37
OTHER AcTivrrxEs OF CHURCHES
In every jurisdiction, general statutory language exempts from
taxation various types of eleemosynary property. The adjectives used to
describe the object of the legislative bounty are generally very broad:
"charitable," 2  "benevolent," 28 9 "beneficent." 24  Additionally, and pre-
sumably to avoid exclusionary interpretations, many statutes designate
285 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-271 (1956), "furniture, libraries and
equipment"; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(14) (1958), "equipment"; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 81, § 9 (1957), "furniture, equipment and libraries"; NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 361.105 (1957), "furniture and equipment"; N.J. STATS. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp.
1958), "furniture and personal property"; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-297 (1958),
"furniture, furnishings, books and instruments"; N.D. REv. CODE § 57-0208(6),
"books and furniture"; OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 15.2(4), "books, papers, furniture
and scientific or other apparatus"; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(a) (Supp. 1958),
"books, apparatus ... and furniture."
288 See ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958) ; CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 214;
COLO. REv. STAT. § 137-12-3(7) (Supp. 1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105 (13)
(Supp. 1957); MIcH. ComP. LAWS §§ 211.9, as amended by PuB. ACs 1958, Acr
209, p. 272; MISS. CODE ANN. § 9697 (Supp. 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 137.100(6)
(1952); MONT. REV. CODES § 84-202 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-202 (1943);
N.M. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(2) (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-502 (1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958); Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4)
(1955).
237 Cf. notes 234 and 235, supra. It should be recalled that Delaware, New
York and Pennsylvania exempt all tangible personalty generally, see note 79,
supra, and that intangibles are normally given favorable tax treatment in most
states. See notes 103-105, supra.
288See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958), "all property, real or
personal, used exclusively for . .. purposes purely charitable"; OHio REv. CODE
§ 5709.12 (1953), "real and . . . personal property belonging to institutions that
is used exclusively for charitable purposes"; Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 32-104
(Supp. 1957), "property used by . . . benevolent and charitable societies or
associations."
239 See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 (Third) (1949), property
"used exclusively for benevolent purposes"; MIcH. Comp. LAws § 211.7 (Fourth),
as amended by PuB. AcTs 1958, AcT 190, p. 219, property of "benevolent, chari-
table ... institutions"; Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4) (1955), "property owned and used
exclusively by .. . religious .. .or benevolent associations."
240See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958),
"all property of beneficent and charitable organizations . . . actually and
exclusively used for such charitable or beneficient [sic] purposes."
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specific types of charitable property as exempt-for example, hospitals,
2 4 1
orphanages, asylums,2 42 homes for the aged, 243 Young Men's Chris-
tian Associations,2 44 reformatories, 245 poor houses,246 and missionary
societies.
247
The range of activities which may be eligible for exemption under
general statutes of this type is limited only by the outer contours of that
all-embracing term, "charity," 2 48 and by such specific additional statu-
tory conditions2 49 as may be applicable in particular cases. Recent ex-
241 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 214; D.C. CODE § 47-801a(i) (1951) ;
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-105(12) (Supp.
1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(7) (1957) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9697(f) (Supp.
1958); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-202 (1947); N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(6a); N.D.
REV. CODE, § 57-0208(8) (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 15.2(10) (Supp. 1957);
Wis. STAT. § 70.11(4m) (Supp. 1957).
242 See, e.g., CAL. CONsr. art. XIII, § 1-%a, "institutions sheltering more
than 20 orphan or half-orphan children receiving state aid"; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 12-81(14) (1958), property of "any religious organization ... exclusively used
as ... an orphan asylum"; S.D. CODE § 57.0311(3) (1939), "hospital, sanitarium,
orphanage, asylum, home, resort, or camp" if "used exclusively for charitable,
benevolent, or religious purposes"; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 3802(4), 3832 (1959),
charitable "convent or school, orphanage, home or hospital"; WASH. REV. COnE
§ 84.36.040 (Supp. 1957), "orphanages, orphan asylums"; Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-104 (Supp. 1957), "orphan asylums."
243 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958),
"all property of old people's homes"; WASH. REV. CODE § 84.356.04.0 (Supp. 1957),
"homes for the aged and infirm." Cf. D.C. CODE § 47-801a(K) (1951), "The
National Lutheran Home."
244 See, e.g., MICH. ComP. LAws § 211.9 (Third), as amended by PuB. AcMS
1958, AcT 209, p. 272; NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.110 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-296(5) (1958); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3802(6) (1959); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958). Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1958), "buildings
actually and exclusively used in the work of associations and corporations organ-
ized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men, women and
children"; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(2a) (1951), semble.
245 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(14) (1958), property of "any religious
organization . . . exclusively used as . .. a home for children, a reformatory or
an infirmary"; VA. CODE ANN., § 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958), "orphan or other
asylums, reformatories"; WASH. REV. CODE § 84.26.040 (Supp. 1957), "institutions
for the reformation of fallen women."
246 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(4) (1956), "hospitals, asylums,
poor houses and other charitable institutions"; OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.13 (1953),
"homes for poor children."
247 See, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAw § 4(6a), "real property of a corporation or
association organized exclusively for .. . religious, bible, tract, . . . missionary
. ..purposes"; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958), "religious mission boards
and associations." Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8105 (1953), special exemption
for property of "Sunday Breakfast Mission"; S.C. ConE § 65-1523 (1952), special
exemptions for "Star Gospel Mission" and "Oliver Gospel Mission."
248 See Annot., 108 A.L.R. 284 (1937).
249 See notes 267, 268, 284, 285, 286, infra. In Illinois and New York an
explicit prohibition on racial discrimination is imposed. See ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 120, § 500(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1958), "No hospital, however, which has
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amples of church sponsored activities held to be eligible for exemption
as "charitable" include a home for the aged,2"' seminary to train men
for the priesthood, 2"' home for indigent Catholic ladies,2 2 summer re-
ligious study camp,25 Bible college,2"4 combined seminary and religious
retreat,255 youth recreational center,2 56 salvage enterprise operated for
human rehabilitation purposes,257 Young Men's Christian Association,2 s
social and religious fellowship for students, 259 nonprofit hospital26 0 and
home for neglected and dependent children.2 6'
It is apparent that the broad terms in which most states have
framed their charitable exemption provide a convenient and flexible legal
orifice through which collateral activities of churches may be judicially
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to have denied admission
to any person because of race, color or creed, shall be exempt from taxation ... ";
N.Y. TAX LAw § 4(6j), "no education corporation or association that holds itself
out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation .. . shall deny
the use of its facilities to any person otherwise qualified, by reason of his race,
color or religion." The loyalty oath requirement for tax exemption, imposed by
CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 19 and CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 32, was held un-
constitutional as construed and applied. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, (1958)
First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
250 Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 264 P.2d 539
(1953); Fredericka Home for The Aged v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d
789, 221 P.2d 68 (1950); Solheim Lutheran Home v. County of Los Angeles,
152 Cal. App. 2d 775, 313 P.2d 185 (1957).
251 Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers, 334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225
(1956).
252 Catholic Home for Aged Ladies v. District of Columbia, 161 F.2d 901
(D.C. Cir. 1947).
253 Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d
581 (1954) ; Gull Lake Bible Conference Ass'n v. Township of Ross, 351 Mich.
269, 88 N.W.2d 264 (1958). See Silver Bay Ass'n for Christian Conferences &
Training v. Braisted, 80 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. T. 1920) ; Davis v. Camp Meeting,
57 Ohio St. 257, 49 N.E. 401 (1897).
254 Cleveland Bible College v. Board of Tax Appeals, 151 Ohio St. 258,
85 N.E.2d 284 (1949).
255 People ex rel. Marsters v. Rev. Saletyni Missionaries, Inc., 409 Ill. 370,
99 N.E.2d 186 (1951).
256 Christian Business Men's Committee of Minneapolis v. State of Minnesota,
228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803 (1949). Cf. Assessors of Worcester v. Knights of
Columbus, 329 Mass. 532, 109 N.E.2d 447 (1952), boy scout meeting room.
257 Missouri Goodwill Industries v. Gruner, 357 Mo. 647, 210 S.W.2d 38
(1948).
258 Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 760,
221 P.2d 47 (1950); Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Sestric, 362 Mo. 551, 242
S.W.2d 497 (1951); In re Appeal of Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Pittsburgh,
383 Pa. 175, 117 A.2d 743 (1955).
259 Westminster Foundation v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 70 Pa. D. & C.
111 (1949).
260Tulsa County v. St. John's Hosp., 200 Okla. 176, 191 P.2d 983 (1948).
261Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Shawano County, 256 Wis. 196, 40
N.W.2d 590 (1949).
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extruded for purposes of tax relief where the language of the church
exemption itself is unavailable. In many jurisdictions, however, this
charitable characterization of a religiously motivated program is un-
necessary, for the church exemption may serve the purpose equally well.
Where that exemption is conditioned on use for "religious purposes,"
for example, absence of ceremonial worship is not fatal and the benefits
of the statute may be extended to property utilized for such church-
sponsored purposes as a missionary rest home, 62 home for retired and
superannuated officers of a religious corporation,263 religious retreat,264
church literature publishing establishment,2 6 and foreign missionary
society.2
66
Two impediments to exemption of property used for charitable or
religious (i.e., other than worship) purposes predominate in the case law.
One relates to the commonly imposed requirement that the property be
used "exclusively" for exempt purposes; 267 the other to the equally
prevalent condition that the property be not used for profit.
268
262 House of Rest v. County of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. App. 2d 523, 312 P.2d
392 (1957); Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154
N.E. 816 (1926).
263 City of Asbury Park v. State, Division of Tax Appeals, 41 N.J. Super.
504, 125 A.2d 411 (App. Div. 1956).
264 Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 755, 221 P.2d 59
(1950) ; Franciscan Fathers v. Town of Pittsfield, 97 N.H. 396, 89 A.2d 752 (1952).
265 Congregational Sunday School & Publishing Soc'y v. Board of Review,
290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919). See Dawn Bible Students Ass'n v. Borough of
East Rutherford, 3 N.J. Super. 71, 65 A.2d 532 (App. Div. 1949); Northwestern
Publishing House v. Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 401, 188 N.W. 636 (1922).
266 People ex rel Near East Foundation v. Boyland, 106 N.Y.S.2d 736
(App.T. 1951).
267 See, e.g., CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 137-12-3 (8) (Supp. 1957), "used for
strictly charitable purposes"; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 500(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1958), "actually and exclusively used for such charitable or beneficient [sic]
purposes"; Ono REv. CODE § 5709.12 (1953), "used exclusively for charitable
purposes"; ORE. REV. STAT. § 307.130 (1957), "property owned by incorporated
. . . benevolent, charitable . . . institutions . . . as is actually and exclusively
occupied or used in the . . . benevolent, charitable . . . work carried on by such
institutions"; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(5) (Supp. 1958), "used or operated ex-
clusively for ...charitable purposes"; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 678(a) (Supp. 1958),
no exemption "unless such property is used primarily and immediately for the
purposes of such [charitable] corporations or organizations."
26SThese provisions range from very detailed to very succinct requirements.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 2 (Supp. 1958), "property ... let for rent or hire
or for use for business purposes, shall not be exempt from taxation, notwith-
standing the income from such property shall be used exclusively for . . .
religious or charitable purposes"; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214, exemption
allowed only if "the owner is not organized or operated for profit ...no part of
the net earnings of the owner inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual . . . [and] the property is not used or operated . . . so as to benefit
any ...person, through the distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges
or compensations or the more advantageous pursuit of their business or pro-
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"Exclusive use" is a phrase which peculiarly lends itself to varying
degrees of interpretation, and when coupled to such generalizations as
"charitable purposes" or "religious purposes," constitutes an undisguised
invitation to judicial legislation. In the broadest long-range sense, practi-
cally every program, project or undertaking of a religious organization
may be assumed to be for a religious or charitable purpose; yet some
immediate aspects of the operation may have all the outward aspects
of a purely secular engagement. For example, free housing for under-
paid or unpaid religious personnel assigned to administer and conduct an
exempt activity often is deemed by the sponsoring church to be essential
to a successful religious or charitable program; yet such residential
facilities, which appear to be simply substitutes for other taxable private
homes in use for ordinary residential purposes, do not, if viewed in
terms of their immediate use, constitute part of an "exclusively" religious
or charitable activity. 2 69 Some courts, however, have regarded the legis-
lative policy of such statutes as focused more on ultimate "purposes"
than immediate "use," and have accordingly held personnel living
quarters to be exempt if incidental and necessary to effective conduct of
the exempt religious,2 70 charitable2 71 or hospital institution.2 7 2 The im-
fession"; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8103 (1953), "not held by way of investment";
D.C. CODE § 47-801a(h) (1951), "not organized or operated for private gain";
IOWA CODE § 427.1(9) (1958), "not leased or otherwise used with a view to
pecuniary profit"; MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(7) (1957) "no part of the net
income . . . of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual"; TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-502(2) (1955), no exemption if "any stockholder,
officer, member or employee of such institution shall receive . . . any pecuniary
profit from the operations of that property in competition with like property
owned by others which is not exempt, except reasonable compensation for services
* . . or as proper beneficiaries of its strictly . . . charitable . . . purposes."
26 9 Johnson v. Mississippi Baptist Hosp., 140 Miss. 485, 106 So. 1 (1925),
nurses home; Township of Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Institute, 20 N.J. 86, 118
A.2d 809 (1955), faculty housing at Bible institute; Sisterhood of the Holy
Nativity v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 73 R.I. 445, 57 A.2d 184 (1948), housing
of nuns in building used for retreats, religious conferences and teaching. Cf.
Defenders of The Christian Faith v. Horn. 174 Kan. 40, 254 P.2d 830 (1953).
270 Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 755, 221 P.2d 59
(1950), priests' quarters at retreat; Silver Bay Ass'n for Christian Conferences &
Training v. Braisted, 80 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. T. 1920), employees' quarters at
summer religious training camp.
271 Fredericka Home for The Aged v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal.2d 789,
221 P.2d 68 (1950), personnel of old people's home; Girls' Friendly Soc'y v.
New York, 144 Misc. 839, 258 N.Y.Supp. 945 (App.T. 1932), maid's quarters;
Green Acre Baha'I Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954),
lodging for staff and students at religious camp.
272 St. Francis Memorial Hosp. v. San Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 2d 321, 290
P.2d 275 (1955), residential quarters for nurses, internes and resident physicians;
Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31
(1950), hospital staff quarters; Aultman Hosp. Ass'n v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 114,
42 N.E.2d 646 (1942), student nurses home; Sisters of Mercy v. Lane County,
123 Ore. 144, 261 Pac. 694 (1927), nurses' home.
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pact of statutory language upon the judicial attitude, however, may
materially affect the result. In a leading Ohio case,273 for example,
portions of a building used to house nuns engaged in charitable work
were regarded as within an exemption of property "used exclusively for
charitable purposes"; but the building as a whole was denied tax relief
because another part, used for the residence of a priest engaged in
religious work, was not within the scope of the narrower exemption
accorded property "used exclusively for public worship."
A comparable division of authority, explainable largely in terms of
whether judicial attitudes are directed primarily upon immediate uses or
upon ultimate purposes, exists in connection with activities of church
institutions which produce net earnings which, in turn, are utilized solely
to finance the programs and activities of the church. In the absence of
express statutory direction that such earnings will not preclude exemp-
tion,274 the immediate commercial or non-exempt use is often cited as
the basis for denial of relief despite the primary, and often indispensible,
importance of the revenue derived therefrom in exclusive furtherance
of basic religious, charitable or hospital purposes.2 75 A recent decision
from Idaho276 illustrates well the judicial myopia characteristic of these
cases. Despite the conceded fact that the ultimate purpose behind the
operation of a wheat ranch by a church was the strictly charitable dis-
tribution of flour to indigent, aged, and needy members, the ranch used
to produce the wheat from which the flour would be milled was not
exempt since, in the court's opinion, the test of eligibility was the use
of the property itself (i.e., growing wheat) and "not the use of the
proceeds, income or produce derived from the property." 77 Similarly,
273Mussio v. Glander, 149 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948). Cf. Re
Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School ,151 Ohio St 70, 84 N.E.2d 270 (1949).
274 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201 (Supp. 1958); Ky. CoNST. § 170;
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 91-A, § 10(II C) (Supp. 1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS,
ch. 59, § 5 (Third) (a) (Supp. 1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9697(f) (Supp. 1958);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 361.140 (1957); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 15.2(8) (Supp. 1957);
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(7) (1951).
275Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 760,
221 P.2d 47 (1950), barber shop, restaurant, stores, and rented office space in
YMCA; Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729,
221 P.2d 31 (1950), "thrift shop" operated to raise funds for children's clinic;
Sunday School Bd. of the So. Baptist Convention v. McCue, 179 Kan. 1, 293 P.2d
234 (1956), Baptist book store; Christian Business Men's Committee v. State of
Minnesota, 228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803 (1949), rented office space; St. Louis
Gospel Center v. Prose, 280 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1955), rented facilities; Lutheran
Book Shop v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 359, 131 N.E.2d 219 (1955), church book store;
Cleveland Branch of Guild of St. Barnabas for Nurses v. Board of Tax Appeals,
150 Ohio St. 484, 83 N.E.2d 229 (1948), rented apartment; New Orphans' Asylum
of Colored Children v. Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Ohio St. 219, 80 N.E.2d 761
(1948).
270 Malad Second Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
75 Idaho 162, 269 P.2d 1077 (1954).
277 Id. at 164, 269 P.2d at 1079.
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in denying tax exemption to the inventory of a religious book store, the
Kansas court2 7 8 recently drew a distinction between primary and second-
ary uses: ". . . the primary use of the property was to sell it and the
secondary use was to use the gain for religious purposes," and hence it
was not used "exclusively" for religious purposes.
2 7 9
Even the courts which most emphatically deny exemption to revenue
producing projects of otherwise exempt institutions do not carry the
rationale of their decisions to its logical terminus. Thus, if the immediate
use of the property is essentially charitable, the fact that fees are charged
those able to pay in order to help defray costs does not destroy the ex-
emption, provided the fees are not excessive in proportion to costs. 80
Here again, of course, the statutory language may play a controlling
role, perhaps manifesting a legislative intent in favor of exemption
despite the receipt of revenue from the use of the property28 ' or, to the
contrary, disclosing clear intent to deny tax relief in such cases. 282 Even
where the statutes explicitly deny exemption to property which is "used
for profit," however, some courts have construed the prohibition as aimed
only at private gain and hence not as a preclusion of tax relief where all
proceeds are used for exempt purposes.
28 3
Other statutory requirements for exemption, in addition to those
already mentioned, are frequently prescribed, and of course must be
satisfied. Illustrative of the heterogeneity of legislative policies intro-
duced into the general problem are the unique condition in California
demanding that the exempt charitable property be "irrevocably dedi-
cated" to exempt purposes; 284 the somewhat provincial requirement in
278 Sunday School Bd. of the Southern Baptist Convention v. McCue, 179
Kan. 1, 293 P.2d 234 (1956).
279Id. at 5-6, 293 P.2d at 237.
280 See Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d
760, 221 P.2d 47 (1950) ; Fredericka Home for the Aged v. County of San Diego,
35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d 68 (1950) ; Congregational Sunday School & Publishing
Soc'y v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919); Green Acre Baha'I
Institute v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350, 110 A.2d 581 (1954) ; House of Good
Shepherd v. Board of Equalization, 113 Neb. 489, 203 N.W. 632 (1925) ; St. Eliza-
beth Hosp. v. Lancaster County, 109 Neb. 104, 189 N.W. 981 (1922); Application
of New York Conference Ass'n, 111 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup.Ct. 1949), aff'd mem.,
304 N.Y. 706, 107 N.E.2d 654- (1952); American Issue Publishing Co. v. Evatt,
137 Ohio St. 264-, 28 N.E.2d 613 (1940).
281 See note 274, supra.
282 See Sutter Hosp. v. City of Sacramento, 39 Cal. 2d 33, 244 P.2d 390
(1952). Following this decision, the California Code was amended in an effort to
avoid the same result in the future. CAL. STATs. 1953, c. 730, p. 1994. See St.
Francis Memorial Hosp. v. City & County of San Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 2d 321,
290 P.2d 275 (1955).
283 See Nebraska Conference Ass'n v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588, 90
N.W.2d 50 (1958).
284 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214 (Deering 1953). See Pacific Home v.
County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 264 P.2d 539 (1953) ; Goodwill Indus. v.
County of Los Angeles, 117 Cal. App. 2d 19, 254 P.2d 877 (1953).
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some states that the charitable uses be for the benefit primarily of resi-
dents of the state granting the exemption; 285 and the rule in some states
extending exemption only to charitable organizations which are locally
incorporated. 28 6 Compliance with conditions of this type presents chiefly
a practical rather than legal problem for churches seeking exemption.
CONCLUSION
The heterogeneity of legislative sub-policies which give specificity to
the generally accepted policy of church exemption illustrates the healthy
diversity within unity which can exist in a federal system of govern-
ment. Such diversity suggests, however, lack of agreement on dearly
defined principles to govern exemption of church property, as well as
differences with respect to the appropriate scope and function which
exemption plays as a part of the general tax pattern.28 7
On the other hand, some of the apparent lack of uniformity
appears to be in reality merely the fortuitous consequence of inadvertent
differences in draftsmanship, of possibly intuitive preferences for particu-
lar phraseology based upon largely inarticulated and inadequately con-
285 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(14) (1958), exempting property
owned by any religious organization and used exclusively as "a Connecticut non-
profit camp or recreational facility for religious purposes"; D.C. CODE § 47-801a
(h) (1951), "used for purposes of public charity principally in the District of
Columbia"; ME. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 91-A, § 10(II A) (Supp. 1957), "no such
institution shall be entitled to tax exemption if it is in fact conducted or operated
principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine"; OKLA. STAT.
tit. 68, § 15.2(9) (Supp. 1957), "property used exclusively and directly for chari-
table purposes within this State." In the absence of express statutory language in
point, arguments in favor of exempting only charities operating for the benefit of
local residents have occasionally prevailed. See Young Life Campaign v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 134 Colo. 15, 300 P.2d 535 (1956). However, the better view
seems clearly to the contrary. In re Appeal of West Indies Mission, 180 Pa. Super.
216, 119 A.2d 550 (1956), rev'd, 387 Pa. 534, 128 A.2d 773 (1957). See also,
People ex rel. Near East Foundation v. Boyland, 106 N.Y.S.2d 736, 740 (App.T.
1951), where the court rejects the local beneficiary theory, saying, "In this
changing world we are realizing more and more that charity is not provincial
and that we help ourselves directly and indirectly by helping mankind every-
where. . . . Charity knows no boundaries or classes. It would not be true charity
if it did."
286 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-81(7) (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 91-A, § 10(11) (Supp. 1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 59, § 5 (Third) (Supp.
1958); MICH. Comsp. LAWS, § 211.7 (Fourth), as amended by Pua. ACmS 1958,
ACT 190, p. 219; WXis. STAT. § 70.11(11) (1955). Cf. Methodist Book Concern v.
Galloway, 186 Ore. 585, 203 P.2d 319 (1949).
287 See PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 183 (1953); Killough, Ex-
emptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Organizations, in TAX POLICY
LEAGUE, TAx EXEMInONs 23 (1939); Mowry, Ought Church Property to be
Taxed? 15 GREEN BAY 414 (1903) ; Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions
in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 144- (1949); Note, Real
Property Tax Exemption of Churches, 29 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 121 (1954).
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sidered premises.2"' Although empirical evidence may not be readily
available to support this proposition, one at least wonders whether the
differences in exemptability under a statute which predicates exemption
upon "religious worship" as compared with one demanding only "re-
ligious purposes," or a statute basing exemption upon ownership as
compared with one insisting on "use" for specified purposes, are in all
instances the result of deliberately preconceived policy. At any rate, the
obvious differences which do exist seem clearly to invite an intelligent
reconsideration of church exemption policies, in the light of overall tax
and exemption considerations.
Much of the legal literature relating to tax exemptions stresses,
as the most significant feature of the extensive litigation relating thereto,
the dichotomy between strict and liberal interpretation."' The cases
themselves, however, strongly suggest that the specific statutory language
in which the exemption is formulated has had a far greater influence
upon decision than theoretical doctrines of interpretation.2 90 This is not
to deny that judicial predispositions have not had their influence; but it
is to suggest that such influence has served primarily to tip the scales
where the statutory language is not rather clearly pointed in one di-
rection or another. It further suggests that a good deal of unnecessary
litigation may have resulted from the reliance of attorneys on decisional
law, including cases from other jurisdictions controlled by distinguishable
statutory language, rather than upon a hardheaded appraisal of the
potential scope and probabilities of judicial discretion to legislate in the
interstices of the controlling statutory language in the particular juris-
diction. In this sense, church tax litigation constitutes a valuable lesson
in the dangers of being too "case-minded."
The prolific litigation further points to the rather unsatisfactory
nature of most of the constitutional and statutory language relating to
the church exemption-language which due to its imprecision and overly
288 See Note, Exemption of Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Insti-
tutions From State Real Property Taxes, 64 HARv. L. REv. 288 (1950).
2 8 9 See TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AmERICA 175-76
(1948) ; ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES § 460 (1924); Zollman, Tax Ex-
emptions of American Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REv. 646, 653 (1916) ; Notes,
Exemption of Property Owned and Used by Religious Organizations, 11 MINN.
L. REV. 541 (1927); Judicial Restoration of the General Property Tax Base,
44 YALE L. J. 1075 (1935).
290 See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 729,
735, 221 P.2d 31, 35 (1950), ". . . the rule of strict construction does not require
that the narrowest possible meaning be given to words descriptive of the exemp-
tion, for a fair and reasonable interpretation must be made of all laws, with due
regard for the ordinary acceptation of the language employed and the object
sought to be accomplished thereby"; State ex rel Spillers v. Johnston, 214 Mo. 656,
663, 113 S.W. 1083, 1084 (1908), ". . . . strict construction must still be a reason-
able construction". Cf. 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 674 (4th ed. 1924) ; Note, Judicial
Restoration of The General Property Tax Base, 44 YALE L. J. 1075 (1935).
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broad terminology, constitutes a veritable invitation to aggressive and
conscientious tax officers to resolve any doubts against exemptions. 291 As
one of our wisest judges has pointed out in a different context, the
interpretation of statutory language by a public officer charged with the
enforcement of law is frequently different from that of the judge who
must decide the dispute:
If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case for the
side which he represents, and leave decision to the court, or
the administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility
of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will,
at least it may, be surrendered forever; and yet it may be
right.29
2
Since a substantial preponderance-indeed nearly all-of the great
volume of litigation relating to church exemptions has represented an
effort to obtain judicial reversal of adverse determinations by taxing
officers, the responsibility in part may be attributed to the inadequacy of
legislative draftsmanship. Legislative "buck-passing" -- "Let's pass the
bill even if we don't understand it, because the courts will make clear
what we meant"--is, of course, not uncommon; 2 " but in the tax ex-
emption field it may have a particularly vicious impact. Vagueness of
exemption language, coupled with the institutional dynamics of the
assessor's position, tends, by inviting litigation, to impose a practical tax
discrimination upon those churches which are most in need of financial
assistance and least able to afford the costs, financial and otherwise,
of such litigation.
Another feature of the church exemption pattern, with respect to
which little has been said 294 relates to the influence which tax exemp-
tions may exert in motivating or perhaps even controlling decisions of
church policy. The array of special conditions which statutes frequently
impose upon the availability of exemption may impose realistic barriers
to freedom of action. For example, statutory emphasis upon "use" for
exempt purposes, although perhaps without any conscious legislative in-
tent to reach that result, has frequently resulted in denial of exemption
291 Cf. 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 424-26 (1950),
recounting the experience of the District of Columbia Commissioners who in 1942
undertook a strict enforcement policy with respect to church tax exemptions, only
to be met by Congressional legislation which "virtually reestablished tax exemp-
tion of church properties on the basis which had existed" under the more lax
policy prior thereto. See also, DVORIN AND JAMISoN, TAX EXEMPTIONS AND LOCAL
SELF GOVERNMENT 41-42 (1958).
292 Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789 (2nd
Cir. 1946), per Learned Hand.
293 See Aigler, Legislation in Vague and General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REv.
831 (1923) ; Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L. J. 437
(1921). Cf. READ AND MACDONALD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 972-1299
(1948).
294 Cf. BROWN, CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 161 (1936);
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to church buildings under construction.295 Paradoxically, such denial
normally occurs at the very time when the church organization is usually
in most dire need of financial support, at the very time when the funda-
mental considerations justifying tax exemption are at their strongest.
Similarly, statutory emphasis upon "exclusive" use for exempt purposes
has justified denial of exemption despite the fact that the disqualifying
activity was a customary one and possibly even was regarded by the
officers of the church in question as highly essential to the effective
promotion of its religious objectives.2 9 An "exclusive use" requirement
may thus tend to stifle expansion of the role and functions of the
church, at least where financing is difficult, and may tend to confine
religious programs within a preconceived stereotypical pattern which may
be completely anachronistic to the modern conception of the church in
our society.2 9 Statutory language insisting upon "nonprofit" operations
of property, together with judicial insistence that such language pre-
cludes exemption of any property from which net revenues are derived
even though such revenues are devoted exclusively to religious or chari-
table objectives, 2 9 may well exert an influence upon the curtailment of
collateral activities of church groups aimed at production of revenue.
Yet it seems clear that the effectiveness of many forms of church
functions as modernly conceived, such as youth programs, recreational
activities, outdoor camping, youth fellowships, dances and other social
activities, depend upon adequate financing often beyond the capacity of
the membership of the congregation when limited to voluntary donation
techniques. The impact of tax exemptions upon church policies is a
matter which appears to deserve study.
Despite differences of emphasis, shortcomings of statutory language
and unnecessarily voluminous litigation, it is evident that the policy of
exempting church property from taxation is firmly rooted in American
law. Indeed, during the past decade or so, in the face of increasing
concern as to the need for tapping new sources of tax revenue to meet
the ever increasing costs of governmental services together with the
institution of new ones, 299 the church exemption laws, like other ex-
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 187 (1953); RIAN, CHRISTIANITY AND
AMERICAN EDUCATION 1326-27 (1949).
295 See, e.g., First Baptist Church v. County of Los Angeles, 113 Cal. App. 2d
392, 248 P.2d 101 (1952); Annot, 108 A.L.R. 284 (1937). But cf. Application of
Ohave Scholem Congregation, 156 Ohio St. 183, 101 N.E.2d 767 (1951).
296 See e.g., Society of the Precious Blood, 149 Ohio St. 62, 77 N.E.2d 459
(1948) ; Mussio v. Glander, 140 Ohio St. 423, 79 N.E.2d 233 (1948).
297 See SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA, passim (1950).
298 See notes 267, 275, supra.
299 See DVORIN AND JAMISON, TAX EXEMPTIONS AND LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT
(1958); Newcomer, The Gro'wth of Property Tax Exemptions, 6 NAT'L. TAX J. 116
(1953); Stimson, Exemption of Property From Taxation, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411
(1934); Tax Institute, Trends in Real Estate Exemptions, 12 TAX POLICY 3 (Dec.
1945); Todd, Tax Exemption and Tax Delinquency, 12 TAX MAG. 159 (1934).
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emption laws, have been frequently expanded by legislative action.30°
Popularly organized attempts to stem the tide have equally consistently
failed.3 ' The growing strength of church exemptions thus documents
the view that, as one of "those incidental advantages that religious
bodies, or other groups similarly situated, obtain as a byproduct of
organized society," 30 2 tax exemption for churches constitutes one of the
most significant ways by which the state "follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs."3 3
300 See ALA. ACTS 1951, ACT 953 at 1627, increasing hospital exemption from
$25,000 to $75,000; CAL. STAT. 1957, ch. 214 at 876, enacting exemption for church
parking lots; COLO. SESs. LAws 1957, ch. 267 at 804, increasing parsonage exemp-
tion from $3000 to $6000; GA. LAws 1955, ACT 124 at 262, enacting parsonage
exemption; MAss. ACTS 1953, ch. 231 at 171, increasing parsonage exemption from
$5,000 to $10,000; MAss. ACTS 1957, ch. 500 at 423, authorizing exemption of
charitable trusts and of property occupied by charitable organization other than
owner; MICH. PUB. ACTS 1958, AT 190 at 219, exempting nonprofit hospitals;
VA. ACTS 1956 REG. SESS., ch. 478 at 693, exempting, inter alia, missionary societies
and parochial schools; WASH. LAWS 1955, ch. 196 at 821, repealing limitation of
college exemption to one denominational college per religious denomination; Wis.
LAWS 1957, ch. 149 at 169, exempting nonprofit hospitals.
301 The California parochial school exemption, enacted by CAL. STAT. 1951,
ch. 242, p. 502, survived both a referendum vote in 1952 and an attempt at repeal
by initiative measure in 1958, as well as taxpayer's suit. See KLEPS, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, Nov. 4,
1958, 21 (1958); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1
(1956), ap. dism'd, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
302 In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 249 (1948), Reed, J.,
dissenting. See O'BRIEN, JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957).
303 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), per Douglas, J.
